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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of selected state and 
federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither comprehensive in breadth, as 
several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues within individual cases are omitted. 
Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an authoritative guide; rather, they are intended 
to alert the Alaska legal community to judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries 
are grouped by subject matter. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
Vandenberg v. State, Department of Health & Social Services. 
In Vandenberg v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,1 the supreme court held that 
administrators erred in applying only one job description to a reemployment benefit claim where 
the applicant’s actual job was more physically strenuous than that job’s description provided.2 
After sustaining a work-related injury, Vandenberg applied for reemployment benefits.3 In 
compiling the reemployment benefit claim, the independent rehabilitation specialist assigned to 
the case determined that no single job description accurately characterized Vandenberg’s 
position and advocated for listing two descriptions instead, a medium strength and a more 
sedentary job.4  Relying on case law, the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board, however, 
disagreed, deciding only the sedentary job described the demands of Vandenberg’s position, 
thereby making her ineligible for benefits.5 The supreme court, however, sided with Vandenberg, 
reasoning that the administrators read the law too narrowly.6 Rather, the court held that the state 
could be permitted to select multiple job descriptions if warranted by consideration of the tasks 
and duties of the applicant’s job.7 Upon such consideration of the tasks and duties of 
Vandenberg’s job, the court agreed that her job was significantly different from the one selected 
by the administrators.8 Reversing and remanding the administrators’ decisions, the supreme court 
held that two job descriptions could be used to describe an applicant’s job if just one cannot 
properly describe the job’s tasks and duties.9 
 
Botson v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In Botson v. Municipality of Anchorage,10 the supreme court held that, in order for the results of 
a breath alcohol test to be admissible as evidence, the officer administering the test need only 
substantially, and not strictly, comply with the test-related procedures prescribed by the 
Department of Public Safety, so long as the test’s results are still accurate.11 While driving, 
Botson was pulled over by a police officer, who administered a breath alcohol test and found 
Botson’s blood alcohol content to be high.12 After the test had been administered, the testing 
device returned an error code after the officer mishandled it while performing a post-test 
procedure.13 At trial, Botson filed a motion to suppress the test at his trial, arguing that a test is 
only valid where administered in compliance with all the prescribed guidelines.14 The trial court 
																																																						
1 371 P.3d 602 (Alaska 2016). 
2 See id. at 603–04. 
3 Id. at 603. 
4 Id. at 604. 
5 Id. at 603.  
6 Id. at 608. 
7 Id.  
8 See id. at 608–09. 
9 See id. 
10 367 P.3d 17 (Alaska 2012). 
11 Id. at 23–25. 
12 Id. at 18. 
13 Id. at 19. 
14 Id. 
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denied Botson’s motion, holding that the Anchorage Municipal Code required compliance only 
with procedures codified therein, of which the procedure the officer had been performing when 
he mishandled the device was not one.15 The supreme court found no error in the denial of 
Botson’s motion to suppress,16 though it also held that breath alcohol tests must be administered 
in compliance with all of the prescribed procedures, not just those in the Municipal Code.17 The 
supreme court managed to reach the same result as the trial court by pointing to a precedent case 
in which it had held that substantial, rather than strict, compliance is adequate in order for a 
breath alcohol test to be admissible as evidence, so long as the finder of fact has found the test’s 
results to be accurate.18 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that, where it has 
been found that a test has been properly and accurately performed, substantial compliance with 
the Department of Public Safety’s procedures for administering a test, rather than strict 
compliance, is adequate in order for the test to be admissible as evidence.19 
 
City of Valdez v. State 
In City of Valdez v. State,20 the supreme court of Alaska held that the State Assessment Review 
Board has exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals from the Department of Revenue’s assessments 
of oil and gas property taxability and tax valuation.21 The Alaska legislature established a 
statewide regime for the assessment of oil and gas property for tax purposes.22 The Alaska 
Department of Revenue (the “Department”) manages these tax assessments, determining if the 
property is taxable and, if so, the taxable value.23 Three municipalities, partial owners of the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), appealed a tax assessment issued by the Department of 
Revenue.24 The appeal was bifurcated so that the tax valuation assessment was appealed to the 
State Assessment Review Board (SARB) and the taxability assessment was appealed to the 
Department.25 The Department dismissed the taxability appeal for lack of jurisdiction after 
finding issues of valuation.26 The municipalities, through a jointly filed stipulation with the State, 
requested that the dismissal be the final administrative decision of the Department for further 
appeal to the superior court.27 The municipalities argue that the Department does not have the 
authority to decide taxability appeals,28 while the State argues that SARB should not have 
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals on tax valuation assessments conducted by the Department 
and the Department’s interpretation should be given deference.29 On appeal, the supreme court 
																																																						
15 Id. at 20. 
16 Id. at 25. 
17 Id. at 23. 
18 Id. at 24. 
19 Id. 
20 372 P.3d 240 (Alaska 2016). 
21 Id. at 243. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 245 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 247, 248, 253. 
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reasoned that the legislature did not intend to create a bifurcated appeals process and that the 
SARB was created as the single entity to hear oil and gas property appeals.30 The court also 
reasoned that several prior SARB decisions gave weight to the fact that SARB’s jurisdiction 
encompassed taxability assessment appeals.31 The court further noted that only SARB could 
meet the approximate three-month timeline that the legislature set for appeals of assessments and 
that the process of taxability appeals before Revenue can take years for a final judgment.32 
Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that the legislature intended SARB to have 
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals regarding oil and gas property taxability and tax valuation 
assessments.33 
 
Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc. 
In Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc.,34 the supreme court held when a superior court remands a case 
to an administrative agency decisions are not final if they contemplate further proceedings,35  and 
the Alaska’s worker compensation statute requires employers to provide substantial evidence an 
employees’ injuries are not work-related to rebut the presumption the employee’s injury is 
compensable.36 Joseph Huit, an employee of Ashwater Burns, was scratched while working.37 
Subsequently, Huit developed a medical condition warranting hospitalization.38 After 
hospitalization, Huit received conflicting medical opinions as to whether the endocarditis 
resulted from the scratch.39 The Alaska’s Worker’s Compensation Board found that Huit’s injury 
was presumed compensable because Ashwater identified no alternate cause to rebut medical 
professionals concessions that Huit’s scratch could have caused his infection.40 Ashwater then 
appealed to Alaska’s Worker’s Compensation Commission, which decided the Board erred in 
requiring substantial evidence of alternate causes, as opposed to evidence employment did not 
substantially cause the injury.41 Overruling the Commission, the supreme court determined 
decisions are not final while litigants can still submit evidence that may alter the decision.42 
While the court considered that the Commission was created for the purpose of expediency, it 
declared that litigants could appeal decisions that raise important issues of law.43 After justifying 
granting the appeal, the court reversed the Commission’s finding that Ashwater had rebutted the 
presumption that Huit’s injury was compensable.44 The court determined that Ashwater was 
required to prove Huit’s employment did not give rise to his infection, either by showing the 
																																																						
30 Id. at 253–54. 
31 Id. at 254–55. 
32 Id. at 255. 
33 Id. at 256. 
34 372 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2016). 
35 Id. at 914–16. 
36 Id. at 919. 
37 Id. at 908. 
38 Id. at 908–09. 
39 Id. at 909–10. 
40 Id. at 910–11. 
41 Id. at 911–12. 
42 Id. at 914. 
43 Id. at 916. 
44 Id. 
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scratch was not a possible cause of injury or by identifying another possible cause.45 Reversing 
the Commission, the supreme court held administrative agency decisions are not final if they 
contemplate further proceedings,46 and employers must provide substantial evidence that 
employees’ injuries are not work related in order to rebut the presumption that employees’ 
injuries are compensable under Alaska’s worker compensation statute.47 
 
Hudson v. Citibank NA    
In Hudson v. Citibank NA,48 the supreme court held that litigating debt-action claims does not 
waive the right to arbitrate under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act 
(UTPA) and the issue of state-wide injunctive relief depends on the language of the arbitration 
agreement.49 In 1999, Hudson opened a Citibank credit card that included an arbitration clause.50 
In 2010, Hudson fell behind on her payments and Citibank, represented by Alaska Law Offices, 
filed a collection action in district court.51 Citibank was ordered a default judgment that included 
attorney’s fees.52 Hudson filed a class-action complaint against Citibank alleging a violation of 
UTPA by asking for attorney’s fees in excess of the “reasonable” fee allowed.53 In response, 
Citibank moved to compel arbitration.54 The supreme court held that waiver of the right to 
arbitrate under the UTPA is an issue of federal law55 and Citibank did not waive this right by 
litigating its debt collection and asking for attorney fees.56 The supreme court also held that the 
issue of state-wide injunctive relief is an issue of interpretation of the arbitration clause which is 
a question for the arbitrator and remanded this issue.57 Affirming the superior court, the supreme 
court held that the decision to litigate a debt action does not constitute of as a waiver and that the 
issue of state-wide injunctive relief should be decided by the arbitrator interpreting the 
arbitration clause.58 
 
Eder v. M-K Rivers 
In Eder v. M-K Rivers,59 the supreme court held that state regulations do not prohibit the Alaska 
Worker’s Compensation Commission from waiving copying costs for indigent litigants.60 Eder 
was injured while working construction for M-K Rivers in 1975 and received temporary total 
																																																						
45 Id. at 919–20. 
46 Id. at 914–916. 
47 Id. at 919. 
48 387 P.3d 42 (Alaska 2016). 
49 Id. at 46. 
50 Id. at 44. 
51 Id. at 44–45. 
52 Id. at 45.  
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 46.  
56 Id. at 49–50.   
57 Id. at 53. 
58 Id.  
59 382 P.3d 1137 (Alaska 2016). 
60 1142 
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disability.61 In 2012, Eder renewed his claim, this time seeking permanent total disability.62 In 
doing so, Eder requested, and was granted, three extensions for filing his opening brief.63 The 
delay, he asserted, was caused by not being able to access the entire record of his claim because 
he was homeless.64 M-K Rivers argued that the Commission’s ultimate decision to dismiss the 
matter, after the first three extensions, was within its discretion because regulatory rules, 
particularly 8 AAC 45.030(c), require appellants to pay for preparation of the record on appeal.65 
The supreme court court disagreed, concluding that nothing in the rules fairly suggests that the 
Commission is precluded from waiving the fee and granting indigent litigants free copies.66 
Accordingly, the supreme court remanded because the dismissal of Eder’s claim was without 
good cause.67 The supreme court thus held that the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Commission 
may waive the costs of copying records for indigent litigants.68 
 
BUSINESS LAW 
 
Bingman v. City of Dillingham  
In Bingman v. City of Dillingham,69 the supreme court held that an offeror cannot deny the 
offeree the option of rejecting an offer with silence by stipulating in the offer that silence 
constitutes acceptance.70 Bingman did not pay property taxes for multiple years on parcels of 
land that he owned in the City of Dillingham.71 The City then obtained a foreclosure judgment 
against Bingman.72 Bingman then sent a promissory note and security agreement to the City 
promising to pay the back taxes over twenty years.73 The security agreement stated that retention 
of the promissory note, silence, or failure to send a confirmed rejection of Bingman’s offer to his 
California address within a two week period would constitute acceptance of the promissory note 
to prevent foreclosure.74 The City sent a letter of rejection to Bingman’s Alaska address, but they 
did not return the promissory note.75 The supreme court held that Bingman could not enforce a 
contract against the City because there had been no meeting of the minds and that a failure to 
terminate the power to accept could not be construed as acceptance.76 The supreme court also 
reasoned that an offeror cannot require a notification of rejection rather than a notification of 
																																																						
61 Id.at 1138. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1140. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 1141. 
66 Id. at 1141–42. 
67 Id. at 1143.  
68 Id.  
69 376 P. 3d 1245 (Alaska 2016).  
70 Id. at 1248.  
71 Id. at 1246.  
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1247.  
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acceptance to form a valid contract.77 The supreme court affirmed, holding that an offeror cannot 
take away the option of rejection by silence.78 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
In re Petition for Approval of a Minor Settlement T.V.  
In re Petition for Approval of a Minor Settlement T.V.,79 the supreme court held that in 
settlement proceedings, the superior court does not have jurisdiction over non-parties.80 In 2012, 
T.V., a minor, was left paralyzed when he was hit by a car.81 The superior court approved a 
petition which placed the proceeds of the insurance settlements into a special needs trust for the 
benefit of T.V.82 Although the proceeds were correctly deposited in the Arc of Anchorage’s 
pooled trust, the father of T.V., Jack, became displeased with the care and management of the 
settlement money.83 Jack filed a motion in the probate case asking for the Arc of Anchorage to 
return all the funds.84 The court denied Jack’s motion concluding the Arc of Anchorage was not 
a party in the minor’s settlement cases.85 On appeal, the supreme court considered whether the 
superior court was correct in denying Jack’s motion.86 The court noted that Jack’s motion was an 
attempt to state a claim against the Arc of Anchorage and his requested relief was for the Arc to 
give back the settlement money even though the Arc was never a party in the probate case.87 The 
supreme court determined that because the Arc of Anchorage was not a party in the minor’s 
probate case, the superior court did not have jurisdiction over the Arc of Anchorage and correctly 
denied the motion.88 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held in settlement 
proceedings, the superior court does not have jurisdiction over non-parties.89 
 
State v. Andreanoff 
In State v. Andreanoff,90 the court of appeals held a court’s sua sponte dismissal of charges is 
similar to a dismissal by motion of the defendant, and, under Alaska Criminal Rule 45, the time 
for trial begins anew when a defendant is served with refiled charges.91 Rule 45 requires that a 
defendant is tried within 120 days from the date of his or her charges,92 including if the charges 
																																																						
77 Id. at 1248.  
78 Id. 
79 371 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2016). 
80 Id. at 602. 
81 Id. at 599. 
82 Id. at 600. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 601. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 602. 
89 Id. 
90 370 P.3d 1112 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016). 
91 Id. at 1116. 
92 Id. at 1113. 
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are dismissed by the prosecution.93  However, if charges are dismissed by a motion of the 
defendant, the time for trial runs anew from the date refiled charges are served.94 At arraignment, 
the court dismissed the charges for lack of probable cause, because the prosecutor failed to 
include sworn testimony from the arresting officer.95 The State refiled the charges a week later, 
but it took more than two months for the State to serve Andreanoff.96 Because Rule 45 is silent 
regarding what occurs when a court dismisses the charges sua sponte,97 Andreanoff’s attorney 
argued that the court should treat a court’s sua sponte dismissal of charges as if it were a 
dismissal by the prosecution and that, therefore, the charges were close to expiring.98 The district 
court agreed and ruled that the 120 days for trial time ran from the service date of the original 
charges.99 Reversing the district court’s decision, the court of appeals reasoned that a court’s sua 
sponte dismissal of criminal charges benefits the defendant and should function similarly to a 
dismissal by the defendant’s motion.100 The court further reasoned that when a court acts on its 
own motion it is most likely because the defendant is unrepresented, as was the case with 
Andreanoff.101 The court noted, if Andreanoff had been represented at the time, it is likely that 
his counsel would have moved to dismiss the charges for lack of probable cause on the same 
ground the court dismissed them.102 Reversing the district court’s decision, the court of appeals 
held that Rule 45 time begins anew when a defendant is served with refiled charges when a court 
dismisses the initial charges sua sponte, and it should be treated similarly to a dismissal by 
motion of the defendant.103 
 
Seybert v. Alsworth 
In Seybert v. Alsworth,104 the supreme court held that AS 39.50, a conflict of interest law 
governing the conduct of public officials, does not require citizens to exhaust the statute’s 
administrative remedies before filing suit in civil court.105 Seybert, along with four other voters 
from Lake and Peninsula Borough, brought a private action against Alsworth, the borough’s 
mayor, and an assemblywoman for several alleged conflict of interest violations, including three 
under AS 39.50.106 That law contains both a citizen suit provision, under AS 39.50.100, and also 
an administrative remedy under AS. 39.50.055.107 In superior court, Alsworth moved for 
summary judgment on the grounds that Seybert was required by the exhaustion doctrine to 
																																																						
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1114. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 Id.  
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1115. 
102 Id. at 1116. 
103 Id. 
104 367 P.3d 32 (Alaska 2016) 
105 Id. at 38.  
106 Id. at 34. 
107 Id. at 36. 
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exhaust the administrative remedies but had failed to do so.108 The superior court agreed, 
granting summary judgment and staying the proceeding until the Alaska Public Offices 
Commission (APOC) conducted a review.109 The supreme court, however, reversed, reasoning 
that although the exhaustion doctrine generally applies where a statute provides an administrative 
remedy, AS 39.50’s plain text and legislative history both indicated that exhaustion of its 
administrative remedy was not required precedent to a private cause of action, but rather that 
citizens had a choice between parallel remedies.110 The court further reasoned that exhaustion 
was not required because a civil suit neither deprived citizens of the ability to file a complaint 
with APOC, deprived courts of the ability to provide a remedy, nor presented issues of judicial 
competence or jurisdiction.111 The supreme court also rejected the contention that the superior 
court had discretion to stay the proceedings by virtue of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, 
finding that none of the factors usually considered in applying that doctrine applied in this 
instance.112 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is not a prerequisite for a private action under AS 39.50.113 
 
Timothy G. v. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services 
In Timothy G. v. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services,114 the supreme court held that a 
plaintiff must prove a disability by a preponderance of evidence in order to have a statute of 
limitations tolled.115 A stepson filed suit against the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) in order 
to recover for the OCS’s failure to act on reports that had been filed with it relating to a period in 
which the stepson had been abused by his stepfather.116 OCS moved to dismiss the claims against 
it, arguing the two year statute of limitations on the stepson’s claims had passed.117 The stepson 
responded by arguing that he had been left mentally incompetent by the years of abuse, and, 
therefore, the statute of limitations had been tolled.118 The superior court arranged an evidentiary 
hearing to resolve the issue.119 After hearing testimony regarding the stepson’s mental health, the 
court granted OCS’s motion, finding that the stepson was not mentally incompetent.120 
Interpreting the court’s motion as one for summary judgment, the stepson appealed, arguing that 
the motion should have been denied if he had presented “more than a scintilla of evidence” to 
support his claim.121 Looking to a precedent case, the supreme court noted that a claim of mental 
incompetency was a question of fact that must be supported by a preponderance of evidence and 
determined that the superior court had followed the correct procedure in holding an evidentiary 
																																																						
108 Id. at 35. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 37 
111 Id. at 38. 
112 Id. at 39–41.  
113 Id. at 41. 
114 372 P.3d 235 (Alaska 2016). 
115 Id. at 239. 
116 Id. at 236. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 237. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 236. 
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hearing.122 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that the correct standard requires 
the party claiming that the statute of limitations was tolled due to a disability to prove that 
disability by a preponderance of evidence.123 
 
Jerry B. v. Sally B. 
In Jerry B. v. Sally B.,124 the supreme court held that, where a criminal conviction has been 
entered into evidence in a civil suit, the convicted party may be collaterally estopped from 
relitigating issues decided in the criminal case.125 A husband was arrested following allegations 
that he had sexually abused his daughter.126 His wife initiated divorce proceedings and he later 
pled guilty to one count of indecent exposure.127 After the divorce proceedings ended in a court 
decision that heavily favored the wife,128 the husband appealed, arguing that the court had 
improperly relied on his indecent exposure conviction in reaching its decision.129 Based on its 
precedent, the supreme court held that a party in a civil proceeding is collaterally estopped from 
relitigating issues relating to a criminal conviction, enabling the court to rely on the conviction as 
conclusive evidence that the crime did occur, so long as the conviction is for a serious criminal 
offense, the party has had a full and fair hearing, and the issue on which the court’s judgment is 
based (in this case, whether or not the crime occurred) was necessarily decided in the criminal 
proceeding.130 The court held that all of these criteria were met in this case, and, therefore, 
collateral estoppel was appropriate, because indecent exposure is a felony, the husband had been 
represented by counsel during the proceedings, and the elements of the crime of indecent 
exposure allowed the court to infer the nature of the abuse to which the husband had subjected 
his daughter in the manner in which it did.131 Affirming this element of the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that a criminal conviction may collaterally estop a party to a 
civil suit from relitigating issues relating to the crime, such as whether or not the crime 
occurred.132 
 
Sellers v. Kurdilla 
In Sellers v. Kurdilla,133 the supreme court held when the plaintiff is mistaken about the identity 
of the defendant, the complaint can be amended to add defendants, regardless of whether the 
plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the mistake, so long as there is an identity of interest between 
the original named defendant and amended defendant.134 In 2010, Sellers was rear-ended by a 
																																																						
122 Id. at 239. 
123 Id. 
124 377 P.3d 916. 
125 Id. at 926–27. 
126 Id. at 921. 
127 Id. at 921–22. 
128 See id. at 923–24. 
129 Id. at 925. 
130 Id. at 926. 
131 Id. at 927. 
132 Id. at 926–27. 
133 377 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2016). 
134 Id. at 7–8, 10, 13–14. 
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vehicle containing Kurdilla and Stroud.135 Kurdilla identified himself as the driver to Sellers and 
gave her his insurance information.136 Subsequently, Sellers’ attorney received several 
correspondences from State Farm separately and alternatively naming Stroud four times and 
Kurdilla eleven times as “Our Insured.”137 In 2012, Sellers initiated a lawsuit naming Kurdilla as 
the defendant, but later amended the complaint to add Stroud as a defendant.138 The district court 
granted Stroud’s motion to dismiss, and on trial the jury returned a defense verdict for 
Kurdilla.139 On appeal, the superior court found Sellers had abandoned arguments premised on 
Stroud and State Farm’s identity of interest.140 On subsequent appeal, the supreme court noted 
Alaska law allows parties to add defendants through an amendment that “relate[s] back” to the 
original claim, including when the amended defendant(s) has an identity of interest with the 
original.141 The court then noted, even where a plaintiff is on inquiry notice there may be 
multiple possible defendants, relation back is nonetheless allowed in the event of an actual 
mistake of the defendant’s identity or role.142 The court then found the claim that the amended 
defendant shared an identity of interest had not been abandoned, because it left open the 
possibility that the interest was imputed through the insurer.143 Ultimately, the court found 
Stroud did share an identity of interest with State Farm.144 Reversing the superior court, the 
supreme court held when the plaintiff is mistaken about the identity of the defendant, the 
complaint can be amended to add defendants, regardless of whether the plaintiff was on inquiry 
notice of the mistake, so long as there is an identity of interest between the original named 
defendant and amended defendant.145 
 
Cornelison v. TIG Ins. 
In Cornelison v. TIG Ins.,146 the supreme court held that an abuse of process claim will fail 
unless there is an alleged ulterior purpose.147 Floyd Cornelison was declared permanently and 
totally disabled by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board after he hurt his back at work in 
1996.148 In 2007, Cornelison’s employer’s workers’ compensation insurer, TIG Insurance, began 
investigating Cornelison’s claim to show the benefits being paid to Cornelison were excessive.149 
TIG hired an investigator who subsequently produced video evidence showing Cornelison in a 
way that supported a reduction of benefits.150 Cornelison claimed the videos were edited and the 
																																																						
135 Id. at 4. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 5 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 5–6. 
140 Id. at 6. 
141 Id. at 7–8. 
142 Id. at 9–10. 
143 Id. at 13. 
144 Id. at 14. 
145 Id. at 7–8, 10, 13–14. 
146 376 P.3d 1255 (Alaska 2016). 
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investigator was using the edited evidence to bolster his own business.151 After TIG filed a 
petition asking the Board to terminate Cornelison’s benefits, Cornelison separately filed a claim 
alleging an abuse of process by defendant, which was dismissed on summary judgement by the 
superior court.152 Cornelison claimed the superior court improperly dismissed his abuse of 
process claims because of the alleged manipulation of the evidence and the defendant’s failure to 
comply with Board regulations for filing the petition to terminate benefits.153 The court first 
articulated abuse of process as the misuse of a legal process against another primarily to 
accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed.154 The court noted two necessary elements: 
an ulterior purpose and a willful act that is not proper in regular conduct of the proceedings.155 
The court concluded in this case that the defendant did not have an ulterior purpose because the 
claim did not put pressure on Cornelison to perform or to refrain from performing an action for a 
purpose independent of the legal process, for example, there is no evidence Cornelison was being 
extorted by the defendant using the legal process as a threat.156 Agreeing with the superior court, 
the supreme court held that an abuse of process claim will fail unless there is an alleged ulterior 
purpose.157 
 
Johnson v. State, Department of Corrections 
In Johnson v. State, Department of Corrections,158 the supreme court held that prisoners seeking 
judicial review of disciplinary decisions must allege specific facts in their statements of points of 
appeal.159 While at the Goose Creek Correctional Center, Johnson was adjudged in a disciplinary 
proceeding to have possessed contraband.160 After his internal appeal was denied, Johnson 
appealed to superior court.161 His statement of points on appeal merely stated that the 
Department of Corrections had violated his due process rights and thereby prejudiced his right to 
a fair adjudication, as the relevant statute prescribes.162 The statement did not, however, allege 
any specific facts supporting this contention, as the relevant statute also facially requires.163 Over 
Johnson’s argument that his statement of points on appeal was sufficient to provide notice to 
both the court and the State of the basis of his appeal when viewed in conjunction with the 
record, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal.164 It agreed with the State that 
permitting such generic statements to satisfy the statute would open the floodgates to meritless 
pro forma notices of appeal, and that the law’s specific facts requirement was consistent with 
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both the statute’s plain text and its legislative history.165 The supreme court thus held that 
prisoners appealing prison disciplinary decisions must allege specific facts establishing a 
violation of constitutional rights that prejudiced the right to fair adjudication in their statements 
of points of appeal.166 
 
Windel v. Carnahan 
In Windel v. Carnahan,167 the supreme court held that when considering whether a litigant has 
“beaten” an offer of judgment, it is proper to exclude remediation costs not actually undertaken 
by the offeror and also that the cost of remediation to be considered is that which is quoted at the 
time of final judgment.168 Windel contested the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees on 
remand of an earlier appeal,169 alleging that the superior court had erred in its analysis of Alaska 
Civil Rule 68, which addresses attorney’s fees in cases involving offers of judgment.170 Two 
matters were predominantly at issue: First, Windel argued that it was improper for the superior 
court to consider a part of the remediation that Carnahan had not paid for himself, a fact which 
was advantageous to Carnahan in comparing the outcome of the case with an offer of judgment 
Carnahan made in 2006, a year after the Windels filed suit.171 Second, Windel argued that it was 
improper for the superior court not to account for the fact that the ultimate cost of remediation 
was greater than that initially proposed by Carnahan because of delays caused by the appeal, a 
determination that also favored Carnahan in comparing the outcome of the case with his 2006 
offer of judgment.172 The supreme court rejected both of these arguments.173 As to the former, it 
decided that to exclude remediation costs made by third parties from consideration would 
penalize offerors and discourage settlements, contrary to the purpose of Rule 68.174 The supreme 
court also rejected the argument that the matter should be remanded again to determine the 
ultimate cost incurred by Carnahan, holding instead that the proper cost to be considered was that 
at the time of final judgment because a contrary ruling would also undercut the purpose of Rule 
68 and result in needlessly delaying and prolonging litigation.175 Therefore, the supreme court 
held that exclusion of remediation costs undertaken by third parties and the exclusion of 
additional costs caused by the delay of appeal should not be considered in making determinations 
of whether a litigant has “beaten” an offer of judgment.176 
 
Long v. Arnold 
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In Long v. Arnold,177 the supreme court held jury instructions on the substantial factor test of 
causation are proper when they distinguish between substantial and trivial acts.178 In July 2012, 
Arnold cut off Long while driving, forcing her off the road.179 Although Long was moving at ten 
miles-per-hour and did not collide with Arnold or roadside objects, she claimed she was sore on 
a flight two days later.180 The lower court subsequently instructed the jury negligence is a  
“substantial factor” in causing harm where it is a but for cause of harm and where it is not 
“remote or trivial” in causing the harm.181 Long challenges this jury instruction.182 On appeal, the 
supreme court noted that the “remote or trivial” language in the jury instruction was supported 
by Alaska law, which distinguishes between substantial factors and events so insignificant they 
are not ordinarily considered causes.183 Furthermore, the court found the jury instruction clearly 
articulated Long’s burden of proof in the case, because it properly asked the jury to evaluate the 
interrelation of negligence and harm.184 Moreover, the court found the special verdict form 
including the words “substantial factor” was not erroneous, because it was not likely to cause the 
jury to miscarry justice.185 The court then found that the lower court was not required to issue a 
multiple cause instruction because the jury instruction contained a proper instruction of the 
law.186 Upholding the lower court, the supreme court held jury instructions on the substantial 
factor test of causation are proper when they distinguish between substantial and trivial acts.187 
 
Small v. Sayre 
In Small v. Sayre,188 the supreme court held that litigants waive appellate review of jury verdicts 
when they fail to properly challenge the verdicts before the trial court.189 The Smalls brought suit 
after a car accident with the defendant.190 Before the verdict, defense counsel told the judge and 
the Smalls’ attorney that the verdict would be inconsistent if it awarded damages for medical 
expenses without awarding damages for pain and suffering.191 The Smalls’ attorney asked 
whether the opposite situation, in which the jury awarded damages for pain and suffering but not 
for medical expenses, would be inconsistent.192 The judge and defense counsel answered 
negatively.193 The jury later awarded damages to the Smalls for pain and suffering but not 
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medical expenses.194 On appeal, the Smalls argue that the discussion with the judge preserved the 
verdict’s consistency as an issue for review.195  However, the supreme court reasoned that the 
conversation that occurred before the verdict concerned only a hypothetical possibility and was 
not a challenge to the actual verdict.196  The supreme court explained that to properly challenge 
the inconsistency of the verdict, the Smalls needed to request a ruling from the trial court after 
the verdict was returned.197 Affirming the jury verdicts, the supreme court held that the plaintiffs 
had waived appellate review by failing to object to the verdicts before the trial court.198 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
Richards v. University of Alaska 
In Richards v. University of Alaska,199 the supreme court held that a university’s dismissal 
procedures do not violate due process when the university gives the student prior notice and 
conducts a careful and deliberate review process.200 Richards, a Ph.D. student at the University 
of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF), plagiarized a course paper and was required to write a remediation 
paper explaining why her paper was plagiarized.201 Richards submitted her remediation paper, 
but the faculty determined that the paper did not meet the assignment requirements as Richards 
did not acknowledge that her behavior constituted plagiarism.202 This instance, combined with 
other instances where Richards demonstrated a failure to receive criticism, led the faculty to 
conclude at its annual student review meeting that Richards not continue in the program.203 After 
giving Richards notice and an opportunity to resign, the Governance Committee began the 
process of removal as outlined in the Ph.D. Student Handbook.204 Richards exhausted all the 
hearings and appeals available to her in the Handbook, then appealed UAF’s decision to the 
superior court, which affirmed her dismissal from the program.205 Richards appealed to the 
supreme court, arguing that she did not receive due process from UAF.206 The supreme court had 
previously held that academic dismissals satisfy due process when the student is given prior 
notice of the possibility of dismissal and when the decision was “careful and deliberate.”207 
Applying this standard, the supreme court found that Richards had received far more 
consideration than due process required.208 The court noted that Richards was given notice on 
several occasions that her behavior, if left unchanged, could jeopardize her place in the 
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program.209 Furthermore, the court found that dismissal process was careful and deliberate, 
involving multiple meetings and a two-day hearing.210 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the 
supreme court ruled that a university does not violate a student’s due process by dismissing them 
from a program after giving prior notice and conducting a careful and deliberate review 
process.211 
 
State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough 
In State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough,212 the supreme court held that the existing local school 
funding formula did not violate the state constitution.213 The school funding formula requires 
local borough and city governments to contribute funding to maintain and operate local schools 
based on the district’s adjusted average daily membership and the statewide base student 
allocation.214 The Ketchikan Gateway Borough claimed that the local contribution statute 
violated the dedicated funds clause of the Alaska Constitution by earmarking funds for a specific 
purpose.215 The superior court agreed, determining that the contribution constituted the proceeds 
of a state tax or license and thus violated dedicated funds clause.216 However, the court held that 
the funds did not violate the appropriations or governor’s veto clauses because the funds did not 
enter the state treasury.217 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that the school 
funding formula did not violate the dedicated funds clause because the contribution was an 
iteration of a longstanding cooperative program that predated statehood and legislative history 
suggested that  the delegates did not intend for required local contributions to such programs to 
be included in the term “state tax or license.”218 However, the supreme court upheld the superior 
court’s ruling that the school funding formula did not violate the appropriations and governor’s 
veto clauses, reasoning the funds were local money rather than state money and the funds did not 
enter the state treasury.219 By partially reversing and partially upholding the superior court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that the school funding formula did not violate the dedicated 
funds clause or the appropriations or governor’s veto clauses.220 
 
Moore v. State 
In Moore v. State,221 the court of appeals held that reasonable suspicion does not allow police to 
keep a defendant’s luggage overnight and ship it elsewhere for further investigation.222 Police 
seized Moore’s luggage at the Dillingham airport based on tips that he was carrying 
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marijuana.223 After a magistrate judge in Dillingham denied an application for a search warrant, 
police kept the luggage overnight and shipped it to Anchorage to be sniffed by a drug dog.224 The 
drug dog alerted to the luggage, and police applied for, and received, a search warrant in 
Anchorage.225 Moore was convicted of fourth-degree controlled substance misconduct.226 On 
appeal, the court of appeals applied the multi-factor test from Peschel v. State227 to evaluate the 
reasonableness of the seizure.228 The court reasoned that the first two factors, the length of 
detention and whether the traveler was forced to continue his journey without luggage, weighed 
in favor of Moore.229 The State argued that the remaining factors, whether the police gave the 
traveler an adequate explanation and whether the police pursued the investigation diligently and 
in the least intrusive means possible, weighed against Moore because the police informed him 
that they would send the luggage to Anchorage, which they had to because there were no drug 
dogs in Dillingham.230 But the court reasoned that reasonable suspicion did not justify holding 
the luggage for over twenty-four hours and sending it to Anchorage.231 The State then argued 
that it actually had probable cause, but the court rejected this argument on the ground that the 
magistrate judge had properly denied a search warrant.232 Reversing Moore’s conviction, the 
court of appeals held that police violate a defendant’s constitutional rights when they hold the 
defendant’s luggage overnight and ship it elsewhere for further investigation based only on 
reasonable suspicion.233 
 
Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest v. State 
In Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest v. State,234 the supreme court held that a state law 
requiring healthcare providers to notify the parents of minors seeking abortions was not narrowly 
tailored enough to pass strict scrutiny, given the particular state interests served by the law.235 In 
2010, voters approved an amendment to Alaskan law that, among other things, required that 
healthcare providers notify the parents of minors seeking abortions and also imposed a forty-
eight-hour waiting period after notification.236 Planned Parenthood sought to enjoin the 
enforcement of the law on the grounds that it violated the right to privacy and the equal 
protection guarantee enshrined in the state constitution.237 The superior court held that the law 
did not violate equal protection, because minors seeking abortions and minors carrying 
																																																						
223 Id. at 923. 
224 Id. at 923–24. 
225 Id. at 924. 
226 Id. 
227 770 P.2d 1144 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). 
228 Moore, 372 P.3d at 925. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 925–26. 
231 Id. at 926. 
232 Id. at 926–28. 
233 Id. at 926, 928. 
234 375 P.3d 1122 (Alaska 2016). 
235 Id. at 1142–43. 
236 Id. at 1130. 
237 Id. at 1131. 
	 18 
pregnancies to term are not similarly situated, nor did the law violate the right to privacy.238 The 
supreme court began its equal protection analysis by determining that the right to seek an 
abortion is a fundamental right that may only be encumbered when the encumbrance serves a 
compelling state interest, and the law is narrowly tailored so that it serves the interest without 
being over- or under-inclusive.239 It then considered the two interests that, according to the state, 
motivated the law: “aiding parents to fulfill their parental responsibilities” and “protecting 
minors from their immaturity.”240 While the court recognized that both of these interests were 
compelling,241 it held that the notification requirement was not narrowly tailored.242 It reasoned 
that the state’s interest in helping parents fulfill their responsibilities and protecting the health of 
minors applied equally to all classes of pregnant minors, making the law under-inclusive and 
therefore making the unequal treatment of minors seeking abortions and minors carrying 
pregnancies to term unjustifiable.243 Having decided that the law violated the constitution’s equal 
protection guarantee, the court did not feel the need to address the issue of the right to privacy.244 
Holding that the law was not so narrowly tailored as to survive the strict scrutiny given to laws 
that abridge fundamental rights, the supreme court reversed the superior court’s judgment and 
held the law unconstitutional insofar as it violated the constitutional guarantee to equal 
protection.245 
 
Thomas v. State 
In Thomas v. State,246 the court of appeals held that defendants who are represented by an 
attorney may not exercise their co-counsel status to contravene their attorney’s tactical or 
strategic decisions.247 In 2010, Thomas was charged with murder and, because he was indigent, 
the Office of Public Advocacy was appointed to represent him.248 Thomas had a contentious 
relationship with his court-appointed attorney and asked the superior court to grant him co-
counsel status.249 Specifically, Thomas and his attorney disagreed about trial strategy, how the 
case should be investigated, and which pre-trial motions to file.250 Granting Thomas’ motion, the 
superior court believed that Thomas had a right to participate as co-counsel if these 
disagreements were unresolvable.251 As co-counsel, Thomas filed numerous pre-trial motions 
asking the superior court to order the Office of Public Advocacy to pay for additional 
investigations, expert witnesses, and scientific testing.252 The superior court denied his request; 
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Thomas appealed, and argued that the superior court was required to hold an ex parte hearing to 
allow him to freely and openly explain his reasons for wanting these additional resources.253 
Rejecting Thomas’ argument, the court of appeals held that although the right to counsel and 
self–representation are constitutionally protected, co-counsel status should only be allowed if 
defense counsel and defendant can work together and present a coherent defense.254 Since 
Thomas’ co-counsel request should have been denied in the first place and his various pre-trial 
motions were used to attack, instead of supplement, his attorney’s trial strategy, Thomas’ pre-
trial motions constituted an improper use of his co-counsel status.255 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision to reject Thomas’ pre-trial motions, the court of appeals held that defendants who are 
represented by an attorney may not exercise their co-counsel status to attack their attorney’s 
tactical and strategic decisions.256   
 
State v. Borowski 
In State v. Borowski,257 the court of appeals narrowed the intent required to uphold a second-
degree harassment charge as the intent to harass or annoy in making a communication the 
speaker knows will be interpreted as a threat to inflict harm.258 Borowski was charged with 
second-degree harassment for posting the words, “Your [sic] going to get assassinated,” on a 
public official’s Facebook election page.259 The district court dismissed the charge as First 
Amendment-protected speech, after making factual findings on the pleadings and holding that 
Borowski could not be prosecuted unless he seriously intended the stated harm.260 In addition to 
finding procedural error in the district court’s ruling, the court of appeals declared that the 
district court’s standard of intent was ultimately erroneous.261 The court of appeals held that the 
necessary intent was not the subjective intent of the speaker to carry out the threatened harm, but 
the speaker’s knowledge that the communication would be viewed by the recipient or audience 
as a threat.262 Therefore, the court determined the speech qualified as a threat and was not 
protected under the First Amendment.263 The court of appeals thus reversed the dismissal and 
reinstated the charge, holding that the intent required to uphold the second-degree harassment 
charge was intent to harass or annoy in making a communication the speaker knew would be 
interpreted as a threat to inflict harm.264 
 
Brandner v. Providence Health & Servs. 
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In Brandner v. Providence Health & Servs.,265 the supreme court held that a doctor’s due process 
rights are violated when his privileges are terminated without pre-termination notice and hearing 
when there was not sufficient cause for emergency termination.266 Dr. Brandner received an 
order from the Alaska State Medical Board to undergo psychiatric and medical evaluations after 
receiving a complaint he had contacted someone in the Governor’s office and made a threat 
involving a gun.267 He complied with this order and the investigations were thereafter 
dismissed.268 Brandner did not disclose the order he received from the State Board to his 
employer, a “quasi-public hospital,” although his employer’s employment policy required 
disclosure of any orders to them within 30 days of receiving one.269 When his employer learned 
Brandner did not disclose the order to them within the 30 days, the executive committee voted to 
recommend termination of Brandner’s hospital privileges for failure to report the order without 
notice to or presence by Brandner.270 The superior court found that Brandner’s due process rights 
were not violated, reasoning that, when hospital policy requires self-reporting a condition placed 
on a physician’s state license, due process does not require a pre-termination hearing for failure 
to report in violation of that policy.271 On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that terminating 
hospital privileges before a hearing is justified only when there is evidence that a physician’s 
conduct poses a realistic or recognizable threat to patient care, requiring immediate action by the 
hospital.272 The supreme court further reasoned that since there was no determination that 
Brandner was an imminent danger to health or public safety, he should have received pre-
termination notice and hearing.273 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held 
that without sufficient cause for emergency termination, a doctor’s due process rights are 
violated when his privileges are terminated without pre-termination notice and hearing.274 
 
Akers v. State 
In Akers v. State,275 the court of appeals held that a defendant facing a probation revocation has a 
statutory right to a insist on a hearing by a district court judge, rather than a magistrate judge. 
Akers was charged with driving under the influence, and a plea deal was arranged with the State 
and accepted by a district court judge.276 While on probation, Akers was charged with a new 
misdemeanor offense,277 and the State offered Akers a plea bargain to resolve both the new 
charge and the violation of her probation.278 The plea bargain was brought before a magistrate 
judge, who accepted the plea agreement without asking Akers if she had waived her right to a 
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district court judge.279 Akers subsequently violated her probation yet again.280 This time, 
however, Akers rejected the plea offer and asked for an attorney and an adjudication hearing.281 
During an appearance before a district court judge to schedule the adjudication hearing, Akers’ 
attorney asked that the hearing be before a district court judge.282 The judge ruled, however, that 
Akers had waived her right to a district court judge when she appeared in front of a magistrate 
judge for her second offense.283 On appeal, the court of appeals held that magistrate judges are 
not authorized to preside over parole provocation hearings by statute.284 The court declined to 
answer the State’s alternative argument that, nonetheless, a magistrate judge can preside over 
parole matters when parole was part of the sentence given by the same judge.285 The court 
declared that it did not need to answer that question in this case, since Akers’ original sentencing 
hearing was before a district court judge.286 Reversing, the court of appeals held that a defendant 
is entitled to a probation revocation proceeding before a district court judge if she objects to a 
magistrate judge.287 
 
CONTRACT LAW 
 
Gunn v. Gunn 
In Gunn v. Gunn,288 the supreme court held that a lower court’s interpretation of a contract is 
appropriate when it uses the contract text as a whole and relevant extrinsic evidence to interpret a 
disputed contract term.289 In 2010, a husband and wife divorced and disagreed over whether they 
had jointly accrued a 50% marital interest in a joint venture company or whether the husband 
alone possessed the interest.290 They had previously contracted that, if the company sold either of 
its two clients “on or prior to June 30, 2011, [the wife] [would] be paid 25% of the net 
commission from each such sale.”291 When one of the company’s clients was sold in July 2010, 
the parties disagreed as to whether the wife was entitled to 25% of the company’s net 
commission or only 25% of the husband’s commission.292 The lower court held that the wife 
should receive 25% of the net commission, because the plain language stated “net commission,” 
not 25% of the husband’s commission.293 Agreeing, the supreme court reasoned the contract’s 
simple phrasing supported the wife’s interpretation.294 Instead of pursuing her marital interest in 
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the company, the wife agreed to 25% of the net commission if a sale occurred before June 30, 
2011.295 The lower court reasoned this extrinsic evidence supported her interpretation of the 
agreement, because she settled for a chance at a larger share in the commission.296 Finding the 
superior court’s inferences supported by the language of the contract and substantial relevant 
evidence, the supreme court found it did not err in finding the wife entitled to 25% of the net 
commission.297 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a lower court’s 
interpretation of a contract is appropriate when it uses the contract text as a whole and relevant 
extrinsic evidence to interpret a disputed contract term.298     
 
Flint Hills Res. Alaska, LLC v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc. 
In Flint Hills Resources, LLC v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc.,299 the supreme court held that 
the statute of limitations for a claim for breach of a contract’s indemnification term begins to run 
when a request for indemnification is refused.300 Flint Hills purchased a refinery from Williams 
in 2004, and the purchase agreement included an indemnification term.301 When a local 
homeowner sued Flint Hills and Williams for damages from contaminated drinking water in 
January 2010, Flint Hills requested indemnification from Williams.302 Williams refused the 
indemnification request in March 2010, and Flint Hills cross-claimed against Williams in May of 
that year.303 The trial court determined that the statute of limitations for an indemnity claim 
begins to run when the indemnified party becomes aware of a potential cause of action against 
it.304 Under this view, the three-year statute of limitations for contract claims had run on Flint 
Hills’ indemnity claim.305 On appeal, the supreme court looked to principles of contract law.306 
The court reasoned that the statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim begins to run at 
the time of the breach, and that, “intuitively,” the breach of the indemnity clause occurs with the 
refusal to pay the indemnification.307 The court rejected concerns that the indemnified party 
would sit on its damages because the purchase agreement included an incentive for the 
indemnified party to bring its claims sooner rather than later, while also providing that a delay in 
bringing claims would not bar indemnification.308 The court concluded that beginning the statute 
of limitations at the refusal of the indemnification request is consistent with both the principles 
of contract law and the parties’ intentions.309 Reversing the superior court’s decision, the 
supreme court held that the statute of limitations for breach of a contract’s indemnification term 
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begins to run when the indemnifying party refuses the indemnified party’s request for 
indemnification.310 
 
Bachner Co. Inc. v. State 
In Bachner Co. Inc. v. State,311 the supreme court held that the state procurement code applies to 
a contract dispute regarding an ongoing lease and, therefore, a contractor must exhaust the 
procurement codes administrative remedies before filing suit.312 The state entered into a ten-year 
contract to lease office space from Bachner Co. Inc. (“Bachner”) with an option to renew for ten 
additional one-year terms.313 Part of the office space was classified as rent-free, but when the 
state chose to exercise its first one-year option, the parties agreed on a price for that space as 
well.314  The state’s subsequent rent payments, however, did not include the agreed amount for 
the previously rent-free space.315 The state then made a remedying payment and signed a lease 
amendment to include the agreed terms.316 Bachner alleged the lease amendment was invalidly 
signed by the state317 and filed a breach of contract claim in superior court, rather than exercising 
its rights under the procurement code.318 On appeal, the supreme court disagreed with Bachner’s 
argument that the case was a “payment dispute” under ALASKA STAT. 37.05.285 and therefore 
exempt from exhausting the administrative remedies under the procurement code.319 The court 
reasoned that this was not a payment dispute because leasing office space to the state is 
providing “supplies,” not “services,” and only service disputes are payment disputes according to 
the statutory language of the procurement code.320 The court further reasoned that the 
procurement code covers both the acquisition phase of the contract and all phases of contract 
administration.321 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a contractor must 
exhaust the administrative remedies of the state procurement code regarding a contract dispute 
over “supplies” leased to the state before filing suit.322 
 
Thomas v. Archer 
In Thomas v. Archer,323 the supreme court held that a doctor’s promise to contact an insurance 
company for preauthorization was not within the scope of the doctor’s fiduciary duty and was 
not a contract, but may be enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.324 Dr. Archer 
recommended that Thomas be medivacked from Ketchikan General Hospital to a medical facility 
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in Seattle.325 Dr. Archer promised to contact Thomas’s insurance company to get 
preauthorization for the medivac.326 Thomas proceeded with the medivac, but Dr. Archer did not 
get the insurance company’s preauthorization,327 so Thomas was billed over $90,000.328 In 
Thomas’s suit to recover, the trial court granted summary judgment for the hospital.329 On 
appeal, the supreme court held that Dr. Archer’s failure to contact the insurance company was 
not a breach of her fiduciary duty.330 The court reasoned that the physician’s fiduciary duty 
protects patients who have no choice but to rely on the physician’s medical expertise.331 Because 
a promise about insurance authorization is not within the physician’s expertise, the court 
concluded that it was not within the physician’s fiduciary duty.332 The court also held that Dr. 
Archer’s promise was not an enforceable contract because it lacked consideration.333 However, 
the court determined that Thomas may be able to assert promissory estoppel if she would have 
called the insurance company herself instead of relying on Dr. Archer to do so.334 Remanding for 
more fact-finding, the supreme court held that while there could be no recovery under a breach 
of fiduciary duty or breach of contract claim, recovery may be permitted under the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel.335  
 
CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Thompson v. Alaska 
In Dana Ray Thompson v. State of Alaska,336 the court of appeals held that an adult who takes 
care of a child for a month or two months at a time occupies a position of authority over that 
child and resides in the same household as the child pursuant to sexual abuse statutes.337 The 
defendant, Thompson, was convicted with first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, J.C.338 J.C., who 
lived in an isolated rural cabin, would stay with Thompson for large periods of time while J.C. 
completed home-schooling requirements in Anchorage.339 On appeal, Thompson argued that he 
should be charged with a lesser degree of sexual abuse because he was not in a “position of 
authority” over J.C., and the child did not “reside” with him. 340 The court of appeals disagreed, 
holding that the statute was flexible enough to cover the relationship between Thompson and 
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J.C.341 First, the court held that Thompson was in a “position of authority” over J.C.342 The court 
noted that Alaska law defines “position of authority” as, among other things, a teacher, 
counselor, babysitter, “or a substantially similar position” to these positions.343 The court found 
that Thompson’s relationship to J.C. was “substantially similar” to a babysitter, because J.C.’s 
mother wanted her to stay with Thompson so that he could look after her.344 Next, the court of 
appeals held that J.C. and Thompson “reside[d] in the same household.”345 The court determined 
that a “residence” did not have to be permanent to be covered under the statute; rather, a court 
should focus on the nature and duration of the cohabiting relationship.346 The court found that 
J.C.’s two-month and later one-month stay with Thompson constitute “residing in the same 
household,” because they were long stays negotiated by J.C.’s mother for her care.347 Upholding 
the jury’s verdicts, the court of appeals held that an adult who watches a child over a month-long 
period both occupies a position of authority over that child and resides in the same household as 
that child for the purposes of sexual abuse law.348 
 
State v. Fyfe 
In State v. Fyfe,349 the supreme court held that, while criminal traffic offenses are subject to the 
doubling of fines or maximum fines if the offense occurs in a traffic safety corridor or highway 
work zone, such doubling does not apply to the minimum fine for an offense.350 Fyfe was 
convicted of felony driving under the influence of alcohol and received the mandatory minimum 
$10,000 fine for driving through a designated traffic safety corridor at the time of the offense.351 
Because Alaska law imposes a mandatory doubling of certain fines when the traffic offense in 
question occurs in a traffic safety corridor or work zone, the superior court doubled Fyfe’s 
fine.352 Fyfe appealed, arguing that the legislature did not intend to double fines for felonies.353 
The court of appeals reversed the doubled fine, agreeing that the legislative history of the traffic 
safety statute precluded its application to criminal offenses.354 The supreme court held that the 
plain meaning of the traffic safety statute applies to any instance where a person violates one its 
provisions, including by criminal traffic offense.355 The court noted that the legislative history of 
the statute—including decisions not to narrow the statute’s scope and ambiguous evidence as to 
whether the statute meant to address drunk driving—did not weigh convincingly against this 
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plain meaning.356 However, the court held that, even though the statute applies to criminal traffic 
offenses, the fines which may be doubled are limited to any statutorily set or maximum fines—
not the minimum fine.357 The court also noted that the statute specifies that the fine or maximum 
fine may be doubled; this specific, disjunctive language would become superfluous if the statute 
was also applied to minimum fines.358 Further, the court held that the “maximum fine” language 
was intended to assure judges that, under the traffic safety statute, they may increase fines above 
the otherwise imposed cap, whereas judges already have discretion to increase fines where only a 
minimum fine is statutorily imposed.359 Affirming the court of appeals but rejecting its 
reasoning, the supreme court held that while criminal traffic offenses are subject to the doubling 
of set or maximum fines if the offense occurs in a traffic safety corridor or highway work zone, 
such doubling does not apply to the minimum fine for an offense.360 
 
Crane v. State 
In Crane v. State,361 the court of appeals held that testimony containing evidence of a confession 
that was not properly disclosed to the defense constitutes a reversible error.362 Officer 
Hershberger arrested Fred Russell Crane for driving under the influence and first-degree child 
endangerment.363 Officer Hershberger claimed Crane apologized for driving while impaired, 
though there was no recording of the apology and, thus, it was not admissible in testimony.364 
During the trial, but prior to his own testimony, Office Hershberger remembered the apology and 
alerted the prosecutor, but the prosecutor failed to notify the defense.365 Officer Hershberger was 
called as a rebuttal witness and testified that, even though it was not contained in the State’s 
discovery material, Crane had apologized.366 The trial judge ordered the testimony regarding the 
apology to be disregarded and denied the defense’s request for a mistrial on the basis that the 
State committed a discovery violation and failed to comply with the Stephan doctrine, which 
requires custodial interrogations at police stations to be recorded.367 The court of appeals held 
this was a reversible error because the prosecutor failed to notify Crane’s attorney prior to 
Officer Hershberger’s testimony.368 Immediate disclosure would have allowed Crane’s attorney 
to cross-examine Officer Hershberger and to investigate and litigate whether a Stephan violation 
had occurred.369 The court also indicated that if the inadmissible testimony had been less 
prejudicial than a confession, the trial judge’s exclusion without a retrial may have been 
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proper.370 Reversing the lower court’s conviction, the court of appeals held that Crane was 
entitled to a new trial due to the prosecutions failure to notify and the nature of the testimony.371 
 
Taha v. State 
In Taha v. State,372 the court of appeals held that vehicle impoundment under section 09.28.026 
of the Anchorage Municipal Code is not a proper exercise of the municipal police force’s 
“community caretaker” function, but must be justified by some other means.373 Section 
09.28.026 authorizes police officers to impound the motor vehicle of a person that is arrested for 
one of six enumerated offenses, including driving while under the influence.374 Taha was 
arrested for driving under the influence and the police impounded his vehicle.375 He was 
convicted for drug and weapon violations stemming from evidence found during an “inventory” 
of the vehicle before impoundment.376 Taha challenged constitutionality of the impoundment.377 
On appeal, the State argued that section 09.28.026’s is a constitutional exercise of a 
municipality’s “community caretaker” function, which allows police to remove vehicles that 
threaten public safety.378 The court of appeals reversed the lower court, reasoning that section 
09.28.026 cannot be supported by the “community caretaker” rationale because it authorizes 
impoundment without regard to whether the vehicle threatens public safety.379 The court then 
considered whether municipal policies adequately limit an officer’s discretion to impound a 
vehicle to situations in which the “community caretaker” doctrine applies, but concluded that 
Anchorage has no such policies.380 Although the court noted that other rationales might justify 
the impoundment, it did not reach a conclusion as to what those might be.381 Reversing the lower 
court’s decision, the court of appeals held that section 09.28.026 is not justified by the 
“community caretaker” doctrine and remanded for a determination of whether the ordinance is 
lawful under some other rationale.382 
 
Jordan v. State 
In Jordan v. State,383 the court of appeals held that when an adult possesses four ounces or more 
of marijuana inside his home, the State must prove that the adult was at least negligent regarding 
the fact that the marijuana equaled or exceeded four ounces.384 During a search, the police found 
that the two defendants each possessed over a pound and a half of marijuana on their residential 
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properties.385 On appeal, Jordan argued that the State must prove a culpable mental state of 
recklessness as to the weight of the marijuana possessed.386 The State argued that no culpable 
mental state was required, but instead only that the defendant must knowingly possess the 
marijuana.387 The court of appeals reasoned that, if the marijuana were found outside of each 
defendant’s residential property, the court would have agreed with the State and held each 
defendant strictly liable for the amount of marijuana in possession.388 The marijuana, however, 
was found on the residential property of each defendant.389 The court of appeals found that the 
right of privacy granted by the Alaska Constitution allows adults to possess in their homes less 
than four ounces of marijuana for personal use.390 Thus, the court further reasoned that holding 
adults strictly liable for possessing four ounces or more of marijuana in their home when they 
innocently and reasonably, but mistakenly, believed they possessed a legal amount would 
notably weaken the constitutional right of privacy granted by the State of Alaska.391 The court of 
appeals affirmed the lower courts conviction of each defendant and ultimately held that when 
marijuana is found inside the home, the State must prove negligence as to the weight of the 
marijuana equaling or exceeding four ounces.392 
 
Bergman v. State  
In Bergman v. State,393 the court of appeals held that a person intends to damage the property of 
another, satisfying the intent element for third-degree criminal mischief, if that person 
intentionally alters another’s property without permission.394 Bergman was convicted of third-
degree criminal mischief for bulldozing three miles of a wilderness trail, widening it into a road 
that was accessible to motor vehicles.395 Bergman argued the evidence failed to establish that he 
intended to damage the road, because his intention in bulldozing the trail was not to damage it, 
but rather to improve it.396 Nevertheless, the court of appeals reasoned that “damage” should be 
construed so as to protect an owner’s interest in using or enjoying property free from alterations 
or attempts from others to change it.397 Because Bergman intentionally altered the trail without 
permission, he significantly impaired the landowners’ interests.398 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the court of appeals held that one has the requisite intent for third-degree criminal 
mischief if that person intentionally alters the property of another without permission.399  
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Pitka v. Alaska 
In Pitka v. Alaska,400 the court of appeals reaffirmed that police cannot search closed containers 
in a vehicle, such as an ashtray, during an arrest without exigent circumstances, unless the 
container is immediately associated with the person.401 In January 2011, police officers in 
Fairbanks stopped a vehicle driven by Pitka after observing a suspected drug transaction.402 
Based on a portable breath test and Pitka’s behavior and answers during questioning, police 
established probable cause for an arrest.403 After a drug-sniffing dog alerted the police to the 
presence of drugs, the police searched the interior of the vehicle and found a bindle of cocaine in 
the ashtray.404 The superior court denied Pitka’s motion to suppress the recovered cocaine 
because the police had probable cause and the search was valid incident to Pitka’s arrest.405 The 
court of appeals agreed that the search did not violate Pitka’s Fourth Amendment rights because 
the police had probable cause to arrest him for a drug offense.406 However, it held that the search 
did violate the search and seizure provision of the Alaska Constitution.407 The court of appeals 
noted that under Alaskan law, when the police arrest the driver of a vehicle and there are no 
exigent circumstances, the police may not search closed containers within the vehicle unless the 
container is within the arrestee’s immediate control at the time of the arrest, the container is large 
enough to contain evidence of the crime for which the person is being arrested, and the container 
is of the type immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.408 The court of appeals 
found that the first two conditions were met, but the superior court failed to consider the third 
requirement.409 To qualify as immediately associated with the person, the court of appeals held 
that state had the burden of proving that an ashtray is generally used, or was actually being used 
in this particular instance, to store items that would generally be stored in a pocket or purse.410 
Reversing the superior court’s decision, the court of appeals held that the state has the burden of 
proving that a container is immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.411 
 
Hicks v. State 
In Hicks v. State, the court of appeals held that a trial court maintains the authority to impose no-
contact orders on pretrial detainees, even though this power is not a statutorily enumerated 
judicial power.412 Nathaniel Hicks was arraigned on a misdemeanor charge for assaulting his 
then-girlfriend, after which the magistrate judge set out Hick’s conditions of bail release, 
including a condition that he have no direct or indirect contact with his former girlfriend.413 
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Hicks was never actually released on bail, but rather was kept in pretrial detention for several 
months, during which period he called his former girlfriend four times from jail, leaving voice 
messages.414 The lower court charged Hicks with four counts of first-degree unlawful conduct, 
under the theory that he recklessly disregarded the circumstances, namely that his phone calls to 
his former girlfriend violated the court’s no contact order.415 On appeal, Hicks argues that, in the 
absence of a statute expressly authorizing the court to issue a no-contact order to a defendant in 
pre-trial detention, the court lacked this power in his case.416 The court of appeals rejected this 
argument, reasoning that, unless the legislature removes or limits their common law authority, 
courts retain the broad power to ensure the orderly and expeditious progress of a criminal trial 
and the power to protect victims and witnesses.417 Upholding the lower court’s decision, the 
court of appeals held that a trial court has the authority to impose no-contact orders on 
defendants who are being held in pre-trial detention, even without a statute explicitly designating 
this power.418 
 
Belcher v. State 
In Belcher v. State,419 the court of appeals held that evidence of a past conviction may not be 
introduced as evidence of “mistake,” unless it shows that the defendant’s conduct was performed 
unwittingly or as a result of a misunderstanding.420 On November 23, 2012, Walmart loss-
prevention officer Dean Brown heard the electric alarm system at the doorway go off, and 
shortly thereafter he saw Belcher walk through the store’s vestibule with a television in his 
cart.421 Brown approached Belcher and Belcher explained that he had bought the merchandise in 
his cart, but did not have a receipt.422 After reviewing surveillance footage and determining that 
Belcher had not paid for the merchandise, Brown contacted the Wasilla Police Department to 
report the theft.423 Belcher was arrested and indicted for second-degree theft.424 At trial, the 
prosecutor attempted to admit evidence that Belcher had been previously convicted for third-
degree theft after the police found him with stolen goods and no receipt.425 The prosecutor 
argued that this evidence was admissible because it tended to disprove that Belcher mistakenly 
threw out the receipt while at Walmart.426 The trial judge ruled the past conviction was relevant 
to the issue of mistake and the jury convicted Belcher of second-degree theft.427 On appeal, the 
court of appeals reasoned that Belcher did not claim that he inadvertently failed to pay for the 
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electronics or that he mistakenly threw out the receipt428 but, rather, that he had paid for the 
items and that the state was simply wrong when it claimed he had not paid for them.429 
Consequently, the court of appeals held that the trial judge erred when she admitted evidence of 
Belcher’s prior theft under a theory of mistake, because the evidence did not show the 
Defendant’s conduct was performed unwittingly or as a result of a misunderstanding.430 
However, given the overwhelming evidence of Belcher’s guilt, this error was harmless.431 
Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that the erroneous admission of Belcher’s 
prior shoplifting conviction did not appreciably affect the jury’s verdict.432  
 
David v. State 
In David v. State,433 the court of appeals held that a petition and supporting documents for post-
conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must set forth specific evidence in 
order to meet the prima facie case—not simply bald assertions.434 David was convicted of 
multiple accounts of assault.435 He then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief regarding 
allegedly ineffective assistance of counsel from his attorney at trial.436 David’s initial petition 
asserted lack of communication, failure to perform pre-trial investigations and file pre-trial 
motions, failure to present expert testimony, conflict of interest, and—as amended—failure to 
warn him of the consequences of pleading guilty regarding the ability to defend any resulting 
civil claim.437 The superior court dismissed each of these claims, holding that David’s petition 
did not present specifics sufficient to make out the prima facie for his claims, and that the 
amended claim for failure to warn of the consequences of pleading guilty was irrelevant because 
David did not plead guilty.438 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s decision, 
reasoning that when the court rules on a post-conviction relief petition’s legal sufficiency, the 
court does not presume the facts stated in the petition to be true without further support.439 
Affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that a petition and supporting documents 
for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must set forth specific 
evidence in order to the meet the prima facie case—not merely bald assertions.440 
 
Hicks v. State 
In Hicks v. State, the court of appeals held that a trial court maintains the authority to impose no-
contact orders on pretrial detainees, even though this power is not a statutorily enumerated 
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judicial power.441 Nathaniel Hicks was arraigned on a misdemeanor charge for assaulting his 
then-girlfriend, after which the magistrate judge set out Hick’s conditions of bail release, 
including a condition that he have no direct or indirect contact with his former girlfriend.442 
Hicks was never actually released on bail, but rather was kept in pretrial detention for several 
months, during which period he called his former girlfriend four times from jail, leaving voice 
messages.443 The lower court charged Hicks with four counts of first-degree unlawful conduct, 
under the theory that he recklessly disregarded the circumstances, namely that his phone calls to 
his former girlfriend violated the court’s no contact order.444 On appeal, Hicks argues that, in the 
absence of a statute expressly authorizing the court to issue a no-contact order to a defendant in 
pre-trial detention, the court lacked this power in his case.445 The court of appeals rejected this 
argument, reasoning that, unless the legislature removes or limits their common law authority, 
courts retain the broad power to ensure the orderly and expeditious progress of a criminal trial 
and the power to protect victims and witnesses.446 Upholding the lower court’s decision, the 
court of appeals held that a trial court has the authority to impose no-contact orders on 
defendants who are being held in pre-trial detention, even without a statute explicitly designating 
this power.447 
 
Thompson v. Alaska 
In Dana Ray Thompson v. State of Alaska,448 the court of appeals held that an adult who takes 
care of a child for a month or two months at a time occupies a position of authority over that 
child and resides in the same household as the child pursuant to sexual abuse statutes.449 The 
defendant, Thompson, was convicted with first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, J.C.450 J.C., who 
lived in an isolated rural cabin, would stay with Thompson for large periods of time while J.C. 
completed home-schooling requirements in Anchorage.451 On appeal, Thompson argued that he 
should be charged with a lesser degree of sexual abuse because he was not in a “position of 
authority” over J.C., and the child did not “reside” with him. 452 The court of appeals disagreed, 
holding that the statute was flexible enough to cover the relationship between Thompson and 
J.C.453 First, the court held that Thompson was in a “position of authority” over J.C.454 The court 
noted that Alaska law defines “position of authority” as, among other things, a teacher, 
counselor, babysitter, “or a substantially similar position” to these positions.455 The court found 
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that Thompson’s relationship to J.C. was “substantially similar” to a babysitter, because J.C.’s 
mother wanted her to stay with Thompson so that he could look after her.456 Next, the court of 
appeals held that J.C. and Thompson “reside[d] in the same household.”457 The court determined 
that a “residence” did not have to be permanent to be covered under the statute; rather, a court 
should focus on the nature and duration of the cohabiting relationship.458 The court found that 
J.C.’s two-month and later one-month stay with Thompson constitute “residing in the same 
household,” because they were long stays negotiated by J.C.’s mother for her care.459 Upholding 
the jury’s verdicts, the court of appeals held that an adult who watches a child over a month-long 
period both occupies a position of authority over that child and resides in the same household as 
that child for the purposes of sexual abuse law.460 
 
Pitka v. Alaska 
In Pitka v. Alaska,461 the court of appeals reaffirmed that police cannot search closed containers 
in a vehicle, such as an ashtray, during an arrest without exigent circumstances, unless the 
container is immediately associated with the person.462 In January 2011, police officers in 
Fairbanks stopped a vehicle driven by Pitka after observing a suspected drug transaction.463 
Based on a portable breath test and Pitka’s behavior and answers during questioning, police 
established probable cause for an arrest.464 After a drug-sniffing dog alerted the police to the 
presence of drugs, the police searched the interior of the vehicle and found a bindle of cocaine in 
the ashtray.465 The superior court denied Pitka’s motion to suppress the recovered cocaine 
because the police had probable cause and the search was valid incident to Pitka’s arrest.466 The 
court of appeals agreed that the search did not violate Pitka’s Fourth Amendment rights because 
the police had probable cause to arrest him for a drug offense.467 However, it held that the search 
did violate the search and seizure provision of the Alaska Constitution.468 The court of appeals 
noted that under Alaskan law, when the police arrest the driver of a vehicle and there are no 
exigent circumstances, the police may not search closed containers within the vehicle unless the 
container is within the arrestee’s immediate control at the time of the arrest, the container is large 
enough to contain evidence of the crime for which the person is being arrested, and the container 
is of the type immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.469 The court of appeals 
found that the first two conditions were met, but the superior court failed to consider the third 
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requirement.470 To qualify as immediately associated with the person, the court of appeals held 
that state had the burden of proving that an ashtray is generally used, or was actually being used 
in this particular instance, to store items that would generally be stored in a pocket or purse.471 
Reversing the superior court’s decision, the court of appeals held that the state has the burden of 
proving that a container is immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.472 
 
Young v. State 
In Young v. State,473 the supreme court held that the Manson v. Brathwaite474 test for evaluating 
eyewitness identifications failed to account for due process reliability concerns and thus devised 
a new test requiring evidence of a system variable of suggestiveness to justify a hearing, 
followed by a totality of circumstances analysis of system and estimator variables affecting the 
identification’s reliability at the hearing.475 Young was charged with attempted murder and 
misconduct involving weapons.476 He challenged the admission of two eyewitness 
identifications, claiming that they were unnecessarily suggestive, but the superior court found 
neither unnecessarily suggestive.477 While the court of appeals disagreed with the superior court 
as to the first identification, it found the error to be harmless.478 Young petitioned to the Alaska 
supreme court, arguing that the identifications were inadmissible under the current test and that 
the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution required adopting a more protective eyewitness 
identification admissibility test.479 The supreme court evaluated the identifications under the 
Brathwaite test, which first requires a determination that the identification be unnecessarily 
suggestive and then considers the totality of the circumstances as to reliability.480 The court 
found that the first identification failed the test,481 while the second identification passed.482 The 
court noted, however, that the Brathwaite test emphasizes the reliability of an identification 
based heavily on the certainty of the witness—which may directly correlate with the process’s 
suggestiveness.483 The court proposed a new test requiring consideration of system and estimator 
variables contributing to an identification’s reliability and necessity, rather than a preemptive 
qualification of outright unnecessary suggestiveness.484 The supreme court affirmed the court of 
appeals,485 but overturned the Brathwaite test for evaluating eyewitness identifications and 
devised a new test requiring evidence of a system variable of suggestiveness to justify a hearing, 
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followed by a totality of the circumstances analysis of system and estimator variables affecting 
the identification’s reliability at the hearing.486 
 
Palmer v. State 
In Palmer v. State,487 the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in requiring a defendant 
to undergo psychiatric evaluations, required of defendants who present a mental disease or defect 
defense, without first hearing whether evidence supported a proposed involuntariness defense.488 
Palmer was convicted of seven counts of third-degree assault.489 After his arrest, it was 
determined that during the alleged assaults Palmer had been suffering from a brain hemorrhage 
caused by a ruptured brain aneurysm.490 Before trial, the State sought to exclude evidence of the 
brain aneurysm on the ground that Palmer had not complied with an Alaska statute requiring 
defendants to give notice and undergo psychiatric or psychological examination before 
presenting a defense based on a mental disease or defect.491 Palmer argued that he was not 
subject to the law, because he proposed to use the brain aneurysm to support an involuntariness 
defense, not a mental disease or defect defense.492  Palmer withdrew the involuntariness defense 
after the superior court determined that he was in fact presenting a mental disease or defect 
defense.493 On appeal, the court of appeals explained the difference between the mental disease 
or defect defense, which goes to the state’s burden to prove a defendant’s mens rea, and the 
involuntariness defense, which goes to the state’s burden to prove a defendant’s actus reus.494 
The court noted that “Alaska courts have yet to address the variety of conditions that can lead to 
a claim of involuntariness,” but that the record in this case was insufficient to resolve whether a 
brain aneurysm can support a claim of involuntariness.495 Nonetheless, reversing the lower court 
and remanding, the court of appeals held a defendant is allowed to first offer particular proof a 
brain aneurysm effected the voluntariness of actions—which evidence must amount to more than 
proof of the aneurysm itself—before a determination is made whether the classification as an 
involuntariness, rather than mental disease or defect, defense is accurate.496 
 
Savo v. State of Alaska 
In Savo v. State.,497 the court of appeals held that it is plain error and prejudicial for a trial judge 
to bar a defense attorney from mentioning a non-frivolous self-defense claim in jury selection 
and in his opening statement.498 The trial judge at hand ruled that Savo’s defense attorney could 
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not mention self-defense to the jury until he presented evidence of self-defense in trial.499 As a 
result, the attorney was forbidden to question prospective jurors on the defense’s theory of the 
case or mention self-defense in the opening statement.500 Savo was ultimately convicted.501 The 
court of appeals vacated the convictions, holding that the trial judge misstated the rule.502 The 
court noted that, while a jury should not be instructed on self-defense if there has not been 
sufficient evidence presented that would support a jury verdict of self-defense,503 such jury is 
still allowed to hear about a non-frivolous self-defense claim before the defendant has a chance 
to introduce evidence.504 The court then held that this error caused substantial prejudice to 
Savo.505 The court reasoned that the defense attorney would reasonably have wished to question 
jurors on their beliefs about whether a man can claim self-defense against a woman.506 The court 
further reasoned that jurors might think that, because they did not hear about self-defense until 
the very end of trial, that Savo’s attorney had made up the defense at the last minute.507 
Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals determined barring a defense attorney from 
telling the jury about the defendant’s self-defense claim during jury selection and the opening 
statement is plain error and prejudicial.508  
 
Buckley v. State 
In Buckley v. State,509 the court of appeals held that mere clerical errors are irrelevant to the 
validity of an extradition order and that the governor of Alaska is authorized to issue an 
extradition order for a person charged with committing a crime in another state even if that 
person was not present in the demanding state during the time of the alleged crime.510 Buckley 
was criminally charged with failing to pay child support in the State of Oregon.511 The Oregon 
governor’s extradition request spelled Buckley’s first name correctly, but the State of Alaska’s 
extradition order misspelled Buckley’s first name.512 Also, Buckley argued he was not present in 
Oregon at the time of the alleged crime.513 Buckley challenged the extradition order by filing a 
writ of habeas corpus, but it was denied.514 Buckley argued that the misspelling of his first name 
and the fact that he was not present in Oregon at the time of the alleged crime prohibited the 
governor of Alaska from issuing an extradition order.515 The court of appeals reasoned, however, 
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that mere clerical errors do not invalidate an extradition order when the record shows 
otherwise.516 The court further reasoned that if Oregon could properly charge Buckley with 
criminal non-support while he was living outside the state, then the governor of Alaska was 
authorized to issue the extradition order.517 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held 
that minor clerical discrepancies in extradition documents will not invalidate the order and that 
Alaska can issue an extradition order to a demanding state despite a person not being present in 
that state at the time of the alleged crime.518 
 
del Rosario v. Clare 
In del Rosaria v. Clare, the supreme court held that a trial court can modify a custody decree in 
order to allow the custodial parent telephonic visitation rights and that so ordering is within the 
lower court’s inherent authority to enforce custody decrees.519 Clare and del Rosario were 
married, had one child, got divorced, and ultimately received shared physical custody of their 
son.520 After Clare moved out of Alaska, del Rosario requested, and the trial court granted him, 
primary physical and legal custody of their son.521 The modified custody decree also gave Clare 
summer visitation right, provided that Kevin could contact the non-custodial parent at weekly 
designated times, and required Clare, when having custody, to provide her location and contact 
information to del Rosario ten days prior to travel.522 A few months later, Clare picked up their 
son for visitation, but failed to provide del Rosario with the requisite information and was 
unresponsive to his phone calls.523 This happened two more times later that week.524 Kenneth 
sought remedy in the trial court, and the court issued a clarifying order, requiring Clare to give 
the son a telephone and to facilitate his ability to use it to contact his father.525 On appeal, Clare 
argues that the court’s clarifying order impermissibly modified the custody degree—namely that 
the custody decree did not grant del Rosario unconditional visitation rights—and that, by 
modifying the custody decree as such, the lower court abused its discretion.526 The supreme court 
rejected this argument, reasoning that it had previously awarded del Rosario sole legal custody 
and had found nearly every custodial factor weighed in his favor, indicating its intent to provide 
him unrestricted access to his son while in Clare’s custody.527 Upholding the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that a trial court has the discretion to modify a custody decree in 
order to give a parent with sole legal custody extra visitation rights when in the custody of the 
non-custodian parent, including telephonic visitation rights, and that the trial court does not 
abuse its discretion by doing so.528 
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Olson v. State 
In Olson v. State,529 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s trial is not void for purposes of 
habeas corpus law when the government relied on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.530 In 2010, Olson was convicted of second-degree sexual assault and fourth-degree 
assault based on evidence police obtained by entering a residence without a warrant.531 During 
his trial, Olson filed a motion to suppress the evidence that police observed and discovered inside 
the house, but the superior court concluded the entry was justified because the officers had 
reasonable grounds to believe an assault was occurring inside the house.532 Olson filed a writ of 
habeas corpus attacking his convictions on the ground that much of the evidence against him was 
the fruit of an allegedly unlawful arrest.533 The superior court dismissed Olson’s petition, 
reasoning that Olson’s argument—that a criminal conviction is void if the prosecution’s case was 
based on evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment—is mistaken, because courts of other 
states have consistently held that the government’s use of evidence obtained through an unlawful 
search or seizure does not make the resulting judgment void for purposes of habeas corpus 
law.534 On appeal, the court of appeals reasoned that, since violations of the Fourth Amendment 
do not diminish the fundamental fairness of the trial and violations of the Fourth Amendment 
normally can not be raised for the first time on appeal, it would be an error to render a criminal 
judgment void under habeas corpus law based on a Fourth Amendment violation.535 Affirming 
the lower court, the court of appeals held that, for purposes of habeas corpus law, a defendant’s 
trial is not void if the government relied on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.536 
 
AB&M Enterprises, Inc. v. State 
In AB&M Enterprises, Inc. v. State,537 the court of appeals held that the State must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that an employee’s criminal conduct was within the scope of their 
employment to hold an employer liable538 and that a corporation is not liable for solicitation by 
employees who do not hold managerial authority.539 AB&M was charged with fourth degree 
assault based on the conduct of two security guards that it employed at a bar.540 While escorting 
a drunken patron to the security office of the bar, one of the guards indicated that they were out 
of sight of cameras and the other guard punched the patron in the face.541 AB&M appealed its 
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conviction on the grounds that it was not legally accountable for the employee’s actions.542 The 
court of appeals raised the issue of the evidentiary standard for the scope of the employee’s 
action itself and determined that it was too fundamental an error to overlook in a criminal 
case.543 The court also reasoned that attribution of criminal liability to corporations for 
solicitation required managerial authority because the legislature could not have intended for 
corporations to be found to have induced the behavior of all low-level employees.544 Reversing 
the lower court, the court of appeals held that criminal liability imputed to corporations for 
employee behavior requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct was within the 
scope of employment and proof of managerial authority to find liability for solicitation.545 
 
Hess v. State 
In Hess v. State,546 the court of appeals held that, depending on context, it may not be improper 
for a prosecutor to discuss a victim’s reluctance to incriminate a defendant in closing statements, 
but that it is improper for a prosecutor to state in closing that defense attorneys generally engage 
in false vilification of victims of domestic violence.547 Hess allegedly strangled his mother while 
they were drinking together.548 His mother claimed Hess strangled her, but later equivocated, 
saying that she could not remember.549 Hess was convicted at trial.550 On appeal, Hess argued 
that the prosecutors closing statements that the jury must “protect” the victim were improper.551 
Hess also argued that the prosecutor’s general denigration of defense lawyers strategies to falsely 
vilify victims of domestic violence were improper.552 The court of appeals noted that both 
statements by the prosecutor were, on their own, improper.553 The court of appeals reasoned, 
however, that the statement regarding the victim being “worthy of protection” was not so 
obviously improper when put into context with the prosecutor’s entire statement.554 The court 
further reasoned that the remarks regarding a defense lawyer’s strategies in general were 
improper, but that the comment was not so central to the trial as to make it fundamentally 
unfair.555 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that a prosecutor’s statements 
regarding a victim being “worthy of protection” are not obviously improper when in context, but 
that general statements denigrating a defense lawyer’s strategy are improper.556 
 
State v. Evans 
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In State v. Evans,557 the supreme court held Alaska’s implied consent statute authorizes courts to 
issue warrants for chemical blood tests without consent if there is a showing of probable 
cause.558 After being arrested for driving under the influence, Evans refused to consent to a 
breath test.559 Subsequently, a judge granted a search warrant allowing the police to take a 
sample of Evans’ blood.560 When the test showed Evans blood-alcohol concentration exceeded 
the legal limit, Evans was charged with refusal to submit to a breath test and driving under the 
influence.561 Evans filed a motion to suppress the blood test on the grounds that warrants issued 
for non-consensual blood tests in alcohol cases were not permitted when the defendant had 
refused a breath test.562 The district court granted the motion to suppress and the state petitioned 
for review.563 The supreme court began its analysis with the implied consent statute, noting it 
allowed police to administer chemical blood and breath tests without a motorist’s consent only in 
cases of accidents that caused death or injury or where the motorist is incapable of refusal.564 The 
court then noted the Alaska legislature had passed an amendment to the implied consent statute 
in 2001 to repudiate several court decisions that held non-consensual blood tests pursuant to a 
warrant were impermissible.565 The court then explained the text of the amendment made clear 
the legislature’s intent to free the government to obtain evidence of driving under the influence 
through search warrants.566 The court also determined there was no conflict between the 
restriction on warrantless tests and the power of courts to authorize searches pursuant to 
warrants.567 The court arrived at this harmonization by interpreting the implied consent statute to 
require officers only administer search warrants in circumstances authorized by statute, but 
giving the court authority to authorize chemical tests where probable cause exists.568 Reversing 
the lower court, the supreme court held Alaska’s implied consent statute permits courts to issue 
warrants for chemical blood tests without consent if there is a showing of probable cause.569 
 
Trumbly v. State 
In Trumbly v. State,570 the court of appeals held that sentencing courts have the discretion to 
impose mandatory minimum fines for driving under the influence and refusal of testing 
concurrently or consecutively.571 Trumbly was arrested and simultaneously charged with driving 
under the influence and refusing to submit to a chemical test.572 He received a concurrent fine for 
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these offenses at sentencing, meaning that he was only liable for one fine instead of two.573 
Because Alaska law mandates consecutive prison sentences for these offenses when arising out 
of the same incident, the prosecutor alleged that the concurrent fines violated such law.574 
Agreeing, the sentencing judge modified the judgment and instead imposed consecutive fines 
(separate fines for each offense).575 On appeal, the court of appeals found that the legislative 
history and plain meaning of the statutes in question did not prohibit sentencing courts from 
imposing fines concurrently, only from limiting the suspension of minimum fines.576 The court 
held that sentencing judges thus retained discretion as to whether such fines should be imposed 
consecutively or concurrently.577 Therefore, the court held the modified judgment to be a 
violation of the restriction on double jeopardy and reinstated the original judgment.578 Reversing 
the lower court, the court of appeals held that sentencing courts have the discretion to impose 
mandatory minimum fines for driving under the influence and refusal concurrently or 
consecutively.579 
 
Lane v. State  
In Lane v. State,580 the court of appeals held that a defendant personally must make a knowing 
and voluntary decision to request a verdict of “guilty but mentally ill.”581 At Lane’s trial, the jury 
entered a verdict of guilty.582 During sentencing, Lane’s attorney asked that the trial judge enter a 
verdict of guilty but mentally ill, and the prosecutor and judge agreed.583 After an extremely brief 
conversation during which Lane stated, “I don't understand what's being said,” the trial judge 
found Lane to be guilty but mentally ill and entered a verdict as such.584 The court of appeals 
reversed the superior court’s finding and directed the superior court to enter a verdict of “guilty,” 
holding that Lane did not knowingly consent to the request.585 The court looked to Alaskan rules 
of criminal procedure, which require a court to determine that a defendant seeking to enter a 
guilty plea has understood the allegations, the consequences of conceding the allegations, and the 
fact that they are waiving their right to a jury trial.586 The court drew an analogy between a guilty 
plea and this request, saying that Lane was waiving his right to have a jury determine whether or 
not he was mentally ill.587 The court held that this waiver must be made by Lane personally, not 
his counsel.588 Reversing the convictions, the court of appeals held that a court must determine 
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that a defendant is knowingly and voluntarily deciding to request a verdict of “guilty but 
mentally ill.”589   
 
Moran v. State 
In Moran v. State,590 the court of appeals held that second-degree unlawful contact is a malum 
prohibitum offense, which a defendant cannot be convicted of violating without proof he or she 
was expressly informed of the statute’s prohibition.591 In 2011, Charles Moran was arrested for 
assaulting his wife.592 From jail, Moran called his wife seven times, causing him also to be 
convicted of second-degree unlawful contact and third-degree assault.593 Moran appealed, 
arguing that the second-degree unlawful contact charge was unconstitutional, given he was never 
informed that it would be illegal for him to contact his wife and had no reason to think he could 
not contact her.594 The court of appeals held that, because second-degree unlawful contact is a 
malum prohibitum offense—and therefore not inherently bad, it was a violation of the due 
process clause of the Alaskan Constitution for Moran to be convicted without proof he was 
expressly informed of the statute’s prohibition on communication with the alleged victim.595 The 
court reasoned that without proof of this awareness in a malum prohibitum context, there is no 
proof of mens rea.596 Thus, the court of appeals held that a defendant cannot be convicted of 
violating a malum prohibitum offense without proof that the defendant was expressly informed 
of the statute’s prohibition.597 
 
Barber v. State 
In Barber v. State,598 the court of appeals held that a probation condition prohibiting a defendant 
from knowingly associating with anyone in immediate possession of a firearm or from 
knowingly being anywhere a firearm is present was overly vague and overbroad.599 In December 
of 2010, three masked men entered the residence of Barber and proceeded to beat him with a 
baseball bat.600 The attackers left the home, but Barber grabbed a revolver, chased after them, 
and fired five shots in their direction.601 Barber had a prior felony conviction, so under the terms 
of his probation, he was forbidden from possessing a revolver or allowed to live in a residence 
where he knew a concealable firearm was kept.602 Barber was ultimately convicted of four 
crimes including third-degree weapons misconduct for residing in a dwelling with knowledge of 
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a concealable firearm.603 Barber appealed his conviction to the court of appeals arguing the 
probation condition was overly vague and potentially overbroad.604 The court agreed, concluding 
the probation condition, as written, was vague and appeared to forbid a large scope of 
behavior.605 The court reasoned that the condition seemed to prohibit Barber from visiting a 
police station, talking to police officers, associating with any other citizen exercising their right 
to openly carry a firearm, or even entering the premises of a sporting goods or grocery store 
selling firearms.606 Agreeing with the defendant, the court of appeals found that a probation 
condition prohibiting a defendant from knowingly associating with anyone in immediate 
possession of a firearm or from knowingly being anywhere a firearm is present was overly vague 
and overbroad.607  
 
Sapp v. State 
In Sapp v. State,608 the court of appeals held that a probation officer is not a peace officer for the 
purposes of the criminal offense of failing to stop at the direction of a peace officer.609 Sapp was 
dropping his wife off at the Alaska Department of Corrections when a probation officer asked 
him to park his car and come inside for a conversation.610 Rather than doing as instructed, Sapp 
drove off in his car, ignoring the probation officer’s command for him to stop.611 Having caused 
an accident after fleeing from the officer, Sapp was convicted of, among other things, “failing to 
stop at the direction of a peace officer.”612 On appeal, the court began its inquiry by looking at 
the definition of “peace officer” contained in the statute under which Sapp was convicted, which 
enumerated various specific categories of officials who qualified as “peace officers,” but also 
included a broader catch-all definition as well.613 Looking to an informal opinion from the state 
Attorney General’s office interpreting the definition of “peace officer” in an earlier version of the 
same statute, the court determined that only public employees “who spend substantially all of 
their working hours performing these [police] functions” constitute “officers of the peace,” with 
probation officers being excluded from this definition.614 The court reversed Sapp’s conviction, 
holding that, for the purposes of the criminal offense of failing to stop at the direction of a peace 
officer, a probation officer is not a peace officer.615 
 
Bass v. State 
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In Bass v. State,616 the court of appeals held that drivers involved in accidents where at least one 
person is injured or killed may not be convicted of failing to render reasonable assistance, a 
felony under Alaska law, merely because they failed to provide identifying information.617 Under 
Alaska law, drivers who are involved in accidents where at least one person is injured must 
identify themselves to those injured or to an attending person by giving them their names, 
addresses, and vehicle license numbers618 and render reasonable assistance to injured persons by 
helping them access medical treatment.619 Failing to provide identifying information is a 
misdemeanor, but failing to render reasonable assistance is a felony.620 Bass was charged with 
the felony, but at trial, the trial judge instructed the jury that Bass would be guilty if the State 
proved either that Bass failed to provide identifying information or that Bass failed to render 
reasonable assistance.621 Bass objected to the instruction, but did not argue that that he did, in 
fact, provide reasonable assistance to the other driver and the jury convicted him.622 On appeal, 
the court of appeals held that the jury instruction was not harmless, because there was evidence 
that Bass provided reasonable assistance to the other driver, but no evidence that he provided his 
identifying information.623 The court of appeals reasoned that, since the jury had been instructed 
to convict him either if he failed to provide his identifying information or if he failed to render 
reasonable assistance, it made no difference whether Bass checked on the other driver’s well 
being before he left the scene.624 Therefore, the court of appeals concluded it did not matter that 
Bass failed to argue he rendered reasonable assistance.625 Reversing the lower court, the court of 
appeals held that drivers involved in accidents where at least one person is injured or killed may 
not be convicted of failing to render reasonable assistance merely because they failed to provide 
identifying information.626  
 
Hillman v. State 
In Hillman v. State,627 the court of appeals held that prison inmates could not be convicted under 
a section of a promotion of contraband statute that applied to non-inmates for bringing 
contraband from the outside into a correctional facility.628 ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.330(a) sets out 
two ways for a person to commit the crime of second-degree contraband promotion: subsection 
(a)(1) only applies to non-incarcerated persons and subsection (a)(2) only applies to incarcerated 
persons who obtain contraband while within a correctional facility.629 Hillman was already 
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officially detained in a correctional facility.630 While under official detention, Hillman was 
convicted of second-degree contraband promotion under subsection (a)(1).631 On appeal, Hillman 
argued that she could not be convicted under that section, because it only applies to non-
incarcerated individuals.632 The court of appeals, in agreement, noted that the legislative history 
unambiguously demonstrates that the legislature intended each of the two subsections of the 
statute to apply to two different groups of people.633 The court reasoned that the distinction is 
especially important because the two subsections have different levels of scienter: subsection 
(a)(1) requiring no knowledge of a non-incarcerated person bringing contraband from the outside 
into the correctional facility while subsection (a)(2) requires some knowledge of the already 
incarcerated person.634 Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals held that a person who is 
already officially detained in a correctional facility cannot be convicted under a section of a 
promotion of contraband statute that applied to non-inmates for bringing contraband from the 
outside into a correctional facility.635 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
Bourdon v. State 
In Bourdon v. State, the court of appeals held that the superior court has proper jurisdiction over 
criminal cases regarding Native American sovereign citizens.636 Eugene Brown was convicted of 
four counts of second-degree sexual abuse, appealed more than ten years later, and had his 
convictions affirmed by the court of appeals.637 He then filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing 
that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment against him because he was a Native 
American sovereign citizen.638 The superior court denied Bourdon’s petition, reasoning that it 
was both untimely and without merit.639 On appeal, Bourdon argued that, because he was a 
sovereign citizen, the state of Alaska had no power to enforce its laws against him without his 
consent.640 The court of appeals also rejected this argument, reasoning that the Alaska 
Constitution granted the legislature authority to prescribe state court jurisdiction, and that the 
legislature had authorized the superior court to exercise original jurisdiction over all criminal 
matters that took place within Alaska.641 Affirming the denial of the habeas corpus petition, the 
court of appeals held that because the superior court had jurisdiction over all criminal acts that 
were committed in Alaska, it had proper jurisdiction over Bourdon’s acts which took place 
within the state.642  
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Alexiadis v. State  
In Alexiadis v. State, the court of appeals held that an interlocutory petition for review is part of 
the process of litigating and that defendants cannot be charged attorney’s fees as if a separate 
appeals proceeding had begun.643 The defendant and the state reached a plea agreement which 
was rejected by the superior court.644 The defendant filed an interlocutory petition for review,645 
and the court of appeals held that the superior court had committed error in denying the plea 
agreement.646 The clerk of appellate courts then notified the defendant that attorney’s fees would 
be entered against him pursuant to the statutory scheme by which the state recoups costs when 
indigent defendants pursue appeals.647 The court of appeals found that interlocutory appeals are 
one aspect of the overall litigation in criminal proceedings before a verdict.648 The court 
reasoned that the statutory scheme of taxation to indigent defendants compensates the State for 
attorney work in appeals, specifically for appellate work in an appeals proceedings after a 
conviction has been reached in the original trial.649 Therefore, the court decided that an 
interlocutory appeal is part of the original trial work, and therefore is not statutorily taxable to 
indigent defendants as attorney work on a separate appeals proceeding.650 Reversing the clerk’s 
decision, the court of appeals held that interlocutory appeals are not taxable against indigent 
defendants as if they were separate appellate proceedings beyond the scope of the representation 
for a trial.651 
 
State v. Spencer 
In State v. Spencer,652 the court of appeals held that whether or not a trooper was polite when 
asking a motorist to perform field sobriety tests does not affect the validity of the tests.653 
Spencer was pulled over while driving his four-wheeler in Nenana after the trooper saw signs 
that Spencer was intoxicated.654 Although reluctant, after being told repeatedly to complete the 
field sobriety tests by the trooper, Spencer completed and failed tests and was subsequently 
arrested.655 At trial, Spencer moved to suppress the evidence of his intoxication, claiming the 
trooper unlawfully coerced him into performing the tests.656 The trial court ruled that the trooper 
needed probable cause to compel a motorist to take field sobriety tests, which the trooper did not 
have in this case.657 On appeal, the court of appeals first noted that police in Alaska do not need 
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probable cause sufficient for arrest when requesting a motorist to perform field sobriety tests.658 
The court additionally noted that, even though a motorist has the power to prevent the tests from 
being administered by refusing to cooperate, this does not equate to a constitutionally protected 
right to refuse the tests, as long as the circumstances around the stop as a whole were not so 
coercive that the motorist was subject to arrest prior to the trooper having probable cause.659 
Reversing the judgement of the district court, the court of appeals held that whether or not a 
trooper was polite when asking a motorist to perform field sobriety tests does not affect the 
validity of the tests.660 
 
O’Dell v. State 
In O’Dell v. State,661 the court of appeals held that ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 53 could be used to relax 
a any deadline specified in another rule of criminal procedure as long as the opposing party is 
unable to show sufficient prejudice from the untimely act.662 ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 53 grants 
broad authority to a court to relax criminal procedures where manifest injustice might otherwise 
occur.663 The trial court ordered O’Dell to pay restitution in an amount to be set after 
sentencing.664 ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 32.6(c)(2) gives the prosecutor 90 days after sentencing to file 
a proposed restitution judgment specifying the amount of restitution and who should receive 
restitution.665 Here, the State filed the proposed restitution seven months late, but the trial court 
relaxed the filing deadline and granted the proposed restitution.666 On appeal, O’Dell argued that, 
because ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 40(b) specifically addresses a court’s authority to extend a deadline 
or ratify an untimely filing, then ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 53 could never be employed to relax any 
deadline specified in the rules of criminal procedure.667 The court of appeals reasoned, however, 
that where manifest injustice might otherwise occur and where the relaxation would not be 
allowed under ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 40(b), then a court can invoke ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 53.668 The 
court of appeals also found that relaxing a filing deadline should not cause any legally 
cognizable prejudice to the opposing party.669 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals 
held that ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 53 could be used to relax any deadlines in the ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 
assuming relaxation would not be allowed under ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 40(b) and sufficient 
prejudice did not occur due to the untimely act.670 
 
Wassillie v. State 
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In Wassillie v. State,671 the court of appeals held that a halfway house’s incident report detailing 
an inmate’s escape was admissible as evidence under the business records exception to the 
hearsay rule.672 Wassillie was serving a sentence at a halfway house when he left the premises 
without authorization.673 When the police located him, he was arrested and charged with escape 
in the second degree.674 During the grand jury hearing, the halfway house’s director was called 
as a witness to introduce into evidence the incident report that another member of the staff had 
prepared about the escape.675 Wassillie argued that, because the author of the report did not 
testify, the report constituted inadmissible hearsay.676 The court disagreed, holding that the report 
was admissible because it fell within the business records exception to the hearsay rule, as it was 
the regular practice of the halfway house to make incident reports of escapes, and because it was 
made at the time of the occurrence by a person who gained knowledge of the occurrence through 
a regular activity conducted by the business.677 The court also rejected Wassillie’s argument that 
the report was prepared in anticipation of litigation, as it was the regular practice of the halfway 
house to make reports every time an inmate escaped, and it was not the case that the halfway 
house began keeping records in anticipation of the litigation stemming specifically from 
Wassillie’s escape.678 Affirming the judgment of the superior court, the court of appeals that a 
halfway house’s incident report detailing an inmate’s escape was admissible as evidence under 
the business records exception to the hearsay rule.679 
 
Bowlin v. State 
In Bowlin v. State,680 the court of appeals held that a person pending appeal from a class B felony 
conviction is ineligible for bail if he or she has been convicted of a prior felony within ten years 
preceding the conviction—not the request for bail.681 Bowlin was convicted of a class B felony, 
appealed his conviction, and requested to be released on bail pending the resolution of his 
appeal.682 The superior court denied bail, as Bowlin had been convicted of a felony within ten 
years preceding the current conviction.683 Bowlin argued that the superior court erred in 
calculating the ten years from his current conviction, rather than from the date of his request for 
bail.684 The court of appeals held that the legislative purpose behind the bail statute is to protect 
the public and victims from defendants who, through recidivism, have shown themselves to be 
dangerous.685 The legislative history supports this purpose, as the statute was revised to allow 
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bail for certain less dangerous defendants.686 As nothing in the purpose or history of the statute 
would indicate that the legislature believed recidivist offenders would become less dangerous 
while incarcerated pending appeal, the court of appeals held that common sense required 
calculation of the ten years from the date of the current conviction.687 Affirming the superior 
court, the court of appeals held that a convicted class B felon is ineligible for bail if he was 
convicted of a prior felony within ten years preceding the current conviction.688 
 
Meyer v. State 
In Meyer v. State,689 the court of appeals held whether a Fourth Amendment seizure took place is 
a question of law that the appellate court evaluates de novo.690 Meyer was convicted of felony 
driving under the influence based on evidence obtained by the police.691 Prior to the trial, Meyer 
filed a motion to suppress, claiming the evidence was obtained during an investigatory stop 
without necessary reasonable suspicion.692 During the evidentiary hearing, the superior court 
concluded the encounter was an investigatory stop but was justified as there was reasonable 
suspicion.693 On appeal, the court of appeals concluded the encounter was not an investigatory 
stop and thus reasonable suspicion was not needed.694 On rehearing, Meyer argued the superior 
court’s conclusion as to the investigatory stop was a finding of fact that could not be 
independently reviewed by an appellate court.695 The court of appeals noted historical facts are 
reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” standard.696 However, it concluded the categorization of 
those facts remains a question of law.697 The court reasoned the use of de novo review on appeal 
increases uniformity and predictability by handling the fundamental question as a question of 
law.698 Reaffirming its earlier decision, the court of appeals held whether a Fourth Amendment 
seizure took place is a question of law that the appellate court evaluates de novo.699 
 
Smith v. State  
In Smith v. State, the court of appeals held that a sentencing judge could not rely on unproven, 
speculative allegations when rendering a sentence for a committed crime.700 Smith, a felon on 
probation, was driving by the beach when a seven-year old child ran onto the road and was hit by 
Smith’s car.701 He fled the scene of the accident and was indicted by a grand jury for leaving the 
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scene of an accident as well as first-degree, second-degree, and third-degree assault.702 The 
parties reached an agreement where the State dismissed the assault charges and Smith pled guilty 
to leaving the scene, after which Smith’s expert witness testified that he was not at fault for the 
accident.703 Nevertheless, the sentencing judge sentenced Smith to 10 years of total jail time, and 
his remarks indicated that Smith had not driven prudently, that he potentially had been impaired 
by drugs, and that he fled the scene because he knew he caused the accident.704 On appeal, Smith 
argued that these findings were not supported by the grand jury testimony and were nothing but 
speculation.705 The court of appeals agreed with Smith, vacated the sentence, and remanded the 
case for resentencing, reasoning that the sentencing judge penalized Smith based on an 
unsupported finding of fault.706  Vacating the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held 
that the sentencing judge cannot consider these unproven, speculative allegations in rendering a 
sentence for a committed crime.707  
 
Allen v. State 
In Allen v. State, the court of appeals held that a mistrial was manifestly necessary where a 
proper jury verdict would be impossible because jurors had implicitly accused each other of 
lying during the court’s inquiry into possible juror misconduct.708 Defendant Allen was charged 
with driving under the influence,709 and the arresting officer, Officer Lorring, testified at her trial 
that she drove over the fog line.710 The defense impeached the witness on the existence of the fog 
line,711 which spurred the jury foreman to drive to the highway in question to investigate and 
report back to the jury that no fog line existed.712 Another juror notified the judge of the 
foreman’s conduct,713 which initiated an investigation in which jurors provided contradictory 
answers.714 The judge then declared a mistrial, against the wishes of the defense, on the basis that 
the jurors would not be able to reach a unanimous decision based on their inconsistent 
responses.715 The court of appeals held that the mistrial was necessary because the allegations of 
misconduct would have required further inquiry, which would have revealed the jury member’s 
reports that others were lying, thus removing any reasonable expectation that they could reach a 
proper unanimous verdict.716 The court of appeals affirmed the declaration of a mistrial given the 
unique circumstances of jury members’ contradictory accounts of misconduct.717 For these 
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reasons, the court of appeals held that a mistrial was manifestly necessary where a proper jury 
verdict would be impossible because jurors had implicitly accused each other of lying during the 
court’s inquiry into possible juror misconduct.718 
 
Isadore v. State 
In Isadore v. State,719 the court of appeals held that a defendant may not file an appeal of a bail 
order if the defendant does not remain in custody.720 Isadore filed an appeal of his bail amount 
arguing that it was excessive.721 However, this request was mischaracterized because bail orders 
are interlocutory orders, rather than final orders, meaning that litigants may only petition an 
appellate court for review instead of an appeal which requires review.722 The Alaska legislature 
created the right to appeal bail decisions in AS 12.30.030(a).723 However, this statute only 
created a right to appeal such an interlocutory decision when the defendant remains in custody 
following the bail decision.724 In this case, Isadore was no longer in custody and had obtained his 
freedom by paying bail.725 The court found that his freedom removes the statutorily created right 
to appeal bail conditions, so he could only file a petition for review of his bail.726 The court then 
denied Isadore’s petition for review of his bail conditions.727 Denying the request for review of 
bail conditions for potential excessiveness, the court held that a defendant who is no longer in 
custody may not exercise the statutory right to appeal bail conditions but may only petition the 
court for voluntary review.728 The court of appeals held that defendants who are not in custody 
cannot appeal bail orders.729 
 
Hinson v. State 
In Hinson v. State,730 the court of appeals held that in a trial for failure to register as a sex 
offender charge, it is not plain error to tell the jury the charge involves registration as a sex 
offender.731 While issuing a citation during a traffic stop, Alaska State Trooper Joel Miner asked 
Hinson for his address.732 Hinson provided Miner with his home address for the citation and told 
Miner he was a registered sex offender.733 When Miner ran Hinson’s information through the 
Alaska Public Safety Information Network, he discovered that his address did not match the one 
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Hinson reported to the sex offender registry.734 Hinson was charged with felony failure to 
register as a sex offender for failing to notify the registry of his change of address.735 The 
superior court considered whether it should alter the charge so that the jury only heard Hinson 
had been charged with “failure to register” and not “failure to register as a sex offender,” but 
decided not to.736 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s decision, reasoning that 
attempting to disguise the charge would only lead to juror speculation and engender distrust of 
the legal process.737 The court of appeals further reasoned that it was necessary for the jurors to 
understand the specific nature of Hinson’s duty to register to evaluate the element of intent, 
because a duty to update a sex offender registry as opposed to, for example, a duty to inform the 
Department of Motor Vehicles of a change of address may affect jurors’ evaluation of Hinson’s 
intent.738 Affirming the superior court’s decision, the court of appeals held that in a trial for 
failure to register as a sex offender, it is not plain error to tell the jury the charge involves 
registration as a sex offender.739 
 
Trout v. State 
In Trout v. State,740 the court of appeals held that a trial judge is not required to conduct an 
independent inquiry as to whether a defendant made a knowing and voluntary decision to take 
the stand at his/her trial.741 In 2009, the three sons of Lisa Trout moved in with their father, 
Dunovan Trout after Lisa Trout was incarcerated for felony DUI.742 At some point following, the 
oldest son, J.T., admitted to his father that Lisa Trout had sexually abused him.743 Trout was 
charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and one count of second-degree 
sexual abuse of a minor.744 At trial, Trout chose to testify in her own defense where she admitted 
alcohol abuse and, when asked directly if she thought she might have sexually abused her son 
while black-out drunk, responded “yes.”745 Trout was convicted on all three counts, but claimed 
the trial court made an error by not conducting and on-the-record inquiring into her decision to 
waive her right of silence.746 The court of appeals declared that Trout’s claim is not supported by 
law and would be a new procedural rule that would require the trial court to conduct an inquiry 
every time a defendant chooses to take the stand at trial.747 The court further articulated that such 
a rule is unnecessary, as there is no evidence that criminal defendants are being coerced or 
pressured by their lawyers to testify against their will.748 The court also noted that such a rule 
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might have a chilling effect on defendants choosing to take the stand, especially in instances 
when they do so contrary to their lawyer’s advice.749 Affirming the lower court, the court of 
appeals held a trial judge is not required to conduct an independent inquiry as to whether a 
defendant made a knowing and voluntary decision to take the stand at his/her trial.750 
 
Miller v. State  
In Miller v. State, the court of appeals held that the superior court is only permitted to impose a 
single surcharge on a defendant in a particular criminal case, rather than one for each of his 
convictions.751 Miller was found guilty of more than a hundred counts of possessing child 
pornography.752 At trial, Miller took the stand and denied possessing the pornographic images, 
after which the trial judge allowed admittance of evidence that Miller possessed a book that 
advocated for pedophilia.753 The superior court also required Miller to pay a separate police 
training surcharge for each of his 116 convictions, totaling $11,500.754 On appeal, Miller argues 
that his possession of a book advocating for pedophilia was inadmissible evidence and that the 
surcharge was intended to be only one $100 charge for all convictions, set aside for police 
training.755 The court of appeals denied his argument relating to the book, reasoning that, 
because it was accompanied by other strong evidence, namely that he possessed dozens of other 
pornographic images, this was harmless error.756 However, the court of appeals agreed with 
Miller in regards to the police training surcharges, reasoning that each additional piece of child 
pornography had no real impact on the amount of law enforcement training, if any, necessitated 
by Miller’s case.757 Reversing the lower court in regards to the surcharges, the court of appeals 
held that that only one surcharge is to be imposed on a convict in any one criminal case.758 
 
Tinker v. State  
In Tinker v. State, the court of appeals held that a trial court has the authority to hold a 
defendant’s trial in a venue that was not listed as an approved trial site if the venue was 
appropriate under the statute governing venue changes.759 Tinker was charged with fourth-degree 
assault for an incident that occurred in Hooper Bay, and Alaska statute designates Bethel as the 
presumptive trial site for offenses occurring in that location.760 Tinker’s attorney filed a motion 
asking to move the trial to Hooper Bay, rather than Bethel.761 The district court denied this 
request for a change in venue, reasoning that a judge does not have the authority to hold a trial in 
a location that is neither designated as the presumptive trial site nor designated by the 
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Administrative Director as an approved additional trial site.762 Tinker appealed, arguing that the 
trial court’s reasoning only applies to motions for change of venue by right, and that in a motion 
for discretionary change of venue, the only limitation is that the new trial site must simply meet 
the statutory requirements.763 Agreeing with Tinker, the court of appeals vacated the district 
court’s ruling and remanded the case, reasoning that the district court had the authority to allow a 
discretionary change of venue and that it should hold a hearing to assess Tinker’s assertion that 
Hooper Bay met the statutory requirements.764 Vacating the lower court’s decision, the court of 
appeals held that a trial court has the discretionary authority to permit a change of venue to any 
site, so long as long as it meets the statutory requirements.765  
 
Starkey v. State 
In Starkey v. State,766 the court of appeals held that trial courts have the authority to vacate a 
plainly erroneous discharge order without violating any vested rights under the double jeopardy 
clause.767 Starkey was convicted of fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance 
and, at sentencing, was granted a suspended imposition of sentence and placed on supervised 
probation for two years.768 Starkey appealed his conviction, which in accordance with state 
appellate rules, automatically stayed his probation.769 Following the court of appeals affirming 
Starkey’s conviction, the automatic stay was lifted and Starkey’s probation should have begun.770 
Instead, based on its mistaken belief that Starkey had long since successfully served his full term 
of probation, the superior court issued an order discharging Starkey from his probation and 
setting aside his conviction.771 Subsequently, Starkey was again arrested and the State filed a 
petition to revoke Starkey's probation, arguing that the court's discharge and set-aside order was 
issued erroneously and was therefore without any legal effect.772 Starkey moved to dismiss the 
State's petition to revoke his probation, arguing that jeopardy had already attached to the court's 
discharge and set-aside order.773 On interlocutory review, the court of appeals found that the 
court has the discretionary authority to end a defendant’s probation early if the court finds that 
“the ends of justice will be served” but concluded a plainly erroneous discharge is analogize to 
an illegal sentence that is unauthorized by the law, which is not considered a final judgment for 
purposes of the double jeopardy clause.774 On review, the court of appeals held that trial courts 
have the authority to vacate a plainly erroneous discharge order without violating any vested 
rights under the double jeopardy clause.775  
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M.H. V. State 
In M.H. v. State,776 the court of appeals held that when a juvenile case is not given a specific trial 
date, but is scheduled for a trial call instead, the twenty days’ advance notice required by 
Alaska’s delinquency rules to request a jury trial is calculated based on the trial call date.777 The 
superior court set M.H.’s delinquency case for trial call to be held two months later.778 M.H.’s 
attorneys appeared at the trial call and returned to court two days later, at which time they 
informed the court that M.H.’s case was not resolved and M.H. still desired to go to trial.779 The 
superior court allowed the filing the next day, at which time the prosecutor suggested that the 
court hold a bench trial, rather than a jury trial, on the day of the hearing since M.H. had not 
specifically requested a jury trial.780 Although one of M.H.’s attorneys declared that M.H. did 
indeed want a jury trial, the court denied the request as untimely.781 The court proceeded to hold 
the bench trial six days later.782 M.H. appealed, alleging that the “scheduled trial date” referred to 
in the delinquency rule requiring twenty days’ notice for a jury request meant the specific trial 
date established by the court.783 The court of appeals rejected M.H.’s argument on appeal, 
reasoning juvenile litigants rarely receive notice of their trial date more than a few days in 
advance.784 The court held that the purpose of the twenty days’ notice rule was to give courts 
sufficient notice to prepare for jury trials, a function which would be eliminated if all juvenile 
litigants were excused from the rule for good cause because of the short time between the trial 
call and trial date.785 Affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that when a juvenile 
case is not given a specific trial date, but is scheduled for a trial call instead, the twenty days’ 
advance notice for a jury trial request is calculated based on the trial call date.786 
 
In re Jacob S., 
In In re Jacob S,, the supreme court held that allowing telephonic testimony at a hearing for a 30-
day involuntary commitment petition does not violate procedural due process and that the 
question of least restrictive means is properly decided by the court.787 Jacob S. was involuntarily 
hospitalized for a mental health evaluation after he stopped taking his medication and started to 
experience paranoid delusions about his neighbor.788 After evaluating Jacob, his doctor filed a 
30-day commitment petition, asserting that Jacob had a mental illness and was likely to cause 
harm to himself or others, and also petitioned approval to administer psychotropic medication, 
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because Jacob lacked the capacity to give informed consent.789 A magistrate judge held a 
hearing, at which both Jacob’s neighbor and partner testified telephonically, and the judge 
ultimately recommended the 30-day commitment and medication.790 The superior court 
approved and adopted these findings and issued the orders, and, later, the doctor who evaluated 
Jacob filed another petition for a 90-day commitment order and continued administration of 
psychotropic medication.791 Jacob then requested a jury trial for the medication petition, received 
one, and, based on the jury’s findings, the court determined that no less restrictive alternative to 
commitment existed at that time.792 On appeal, Jacob argued, among other things, that the 
telephonic testimony did not afford him the opportunity to question the witnesses’ credibility, 
thus violating his procedural due process, and that the jury was supposed to make factual 
determinations in regards to potential less restrictive means.793 The supreme court rejected these 
arguments, reasoning that Jacob’s attorney had the opportunity to question the witnesses’ 
credibility during cross-examination but chose not to and that the statutory language on least 
restrictive means explicitly gives the court such authority.794 Affirming the lower court, the 
supreme court held that telephonic testimony provides a defendant a sufficient opportunity to 
question a witness’s credibility, and that the question of less restrictive means is properly 
answered by the court.795 
 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
Bernard v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. 
In Bernard v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,796 the supreme court held that an employee may file suit 
against their employer to enforce rights that do not depend on the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement, and that an employee need not exhaust all contractual remedies before 
bringing suit unless they have clearly and unmistakably waived that right.797 Pursuant to a 
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), an Alaska Airlines employee, Pierre Bernard, 
attended two hearings over his alleged misconduct, where the Airline decided to terminate 
him.798 Two years later, Bernard brought suit against the Airline alleging the Airline had violated 
a state employment discrimination statute, had violated public policy, and had breached the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.799 The superior court dismissed Bernard’s claims 
because Bernard had not exhausted all contractual remedies by exercising an arbitration clause in 
the CBA, and because the claims rested on contractual rights under the CBA that were 
preempted by the Railway Labor Act.800 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision 
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because the Railway Labor Act does not preempt claims regarding rights that are independent of 
CBAs.801 The supreme court also reasoned that states can create workers’ rights that could be 
enforced independent of CBAs,802 and that factual questions about employers’ conduct could be 
determined independent of any CBA.803 The court then determined Bernard’s statutory 
discrimination claim and public policy claim depended on state law and the employer’s motives, 
as opposed to CBA terms, and were not preempted.804 Moreover, Bernard’s claim relying on the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not preempted because the CBA could not alter the 
right in question.805 Additionally, the court found that the CBA did not have a provision 
requiring employees to submit their disputes to arbitration, nor a provision incorporating Alaskan 
law, and therefore was not a waiver of the right to sue.806 Reversing the lower court’s decision, 
the supreme could held that an employee may file suit against their employer to litigate rights 
that do not depend on the terms of a CBA, and that an employee need not exhaust all contractual 
remedies before bringing suit, unless they have clearly and unmistakably waived that right.807 
 
Lingley v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.  
In Lingley v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. the supreme court held that the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) 
does not expressly waive an employee’s right to litigate therefore not requiring employees under 
its collective bargaining agreement to first exhaust contractual remedies.808 Plaintiff was an 
employee for defendant who was terminated for allegedly stealing a left-behind pair of 
earphones from the airplane lost and found, lying about the incident in subsequent interviews, 
and making disparaging remarks about other employees.809 The plaintiff brought a wrongful 
termination suit and followed the grievance process through her labor union until she reached the 
stage of appealing the grievance to arbitration.810 However, the union then withdrew the appeal 
to arbitration, and the plaintiff brought suit.811 The plaintiff amended her complaint multiple 
times after defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that the 
RLA preempted the plaintiff’s claims because she had not exhausted remedies established under 
the collective bargaining agreement under which she was employed.812 The superior court agreed 
with the defendant, denied the plaintiff’s request to again amend her claim, and dismissed the 
existing claims as preempted by the RLA.813 On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that the 
plaintiff’s amended claims were not preempted by the RLA, because it could not preempt state 
claims and the collective bargaining agreement did not waive such a right.814 The court noted 
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that waivers must be “clear and unmistakable.”815 The supreme court found this standard not to 
have been met by the collective bargaining agreement because it did not have an arbitration 
clause that specifically waived the right to litigate nor did it explicitly use state statutory 
language that would have waived such a right.816 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court 
held RLA does not expressly waive employee’s rights to seek recourse outside of the contract.817  
 
Metcalfe v. State of Alaska 
In Metcalfe v. State,818 the supreme court held that state employees may not sue for breach of 
contract damages when the state legislature diminishes retirement benefits.819 In 1981, Metcalfe 
left public employment and took a refund of his contributions to the Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (PERS).820  Under the statute at the time, Metcalfe was entitled to reinstate 
his PERS service tier and credit if he ever returned to state employment, as long as he returned 
the refund he took.821 However, in 2005, the legislature repealed that statute, declaring instead 
that a former employee can only reinstate PERS status five years after he leaves employment.822  
In 2013, Metcalfe sued the state, arguing that the legislative act constituted a breach of 
employment contract.823 The superior court dismissed the suit, saying that the statute of 
limitations for contract disputes had run out.824 The supreme court affirmed the dismissal, 
holding that Metcalfe has no right to sue for breach of contract when the legislature diminished 
his retirement benefits.825 The court held that, although the Alaska constitution declares that state 
employee benefit systems constitute contracts, it does not follow that the constitution grants a 
right to sue for breach of contract when benefits are diminished.826 Instead, the court held that the 
proper remedy would be declaratory and injunctive relief that allow him to keep the retirement 
benefits available to him.827 Since declaratory and injunctive relief is an equitable claim, the 
court declared that statute of limitations does not apply and remanded for further proceedings 
pursuant to that issue.828 The court affirmed the dismissal of his claim for monetary damages, 
holding that state employees do not have the right to sue for breach of contract pursuant to their 
retirement benefits.829  
 
Bockus v. First Student Services 
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In Bockus v. First Student Services,830 the supreme court held that employers may not refuse to 
preauthorize medical care to employees when doing so would excessively delay treatment or 
effectively terminate their medical benefits.831 Bockus, a school bus driver for First Student 
Services (FSS), injured his back, resulting in three spinal surgeries.832 Between his second and 
third surgeries, FSS scheduled Bockus an employer’s independent medical evaluation (EIME) 
with a different doctor.833 This EIME delayed Bockus’ surgery by two months, during which 
time Bockus suffered severe back pain and filed a workers’ compensation claim for the third 
surgery.834 Even though FSS ultimately financed Bockus’ third surgery, the Alaska Workers’ 
Compensation Board (the “Board”) awarded Bockus his attorney’s fees, finding that FSS had 
unreasonably controverted his medical care.835 The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals 
Commission reversed.836 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the Board, reasoning that FSS 
could have conducted an EIME without delaying Bockus’ receipt of medical benefits.837 The 
court concluded that, since FSS failed to do so, there was sufficient evidence to support the 
Board’s finding that FSS’ actions unreasonably delayed Bockus’ compensable surgery.838 
Affirming the Board, the supreme court held that employers may not refuse to preauthorize 
medical care to employees when doing so would excessive delay treatment or effectively 
terminate their medical benefits.839  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State  
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State,840 the supreme court held that a commonsense interpretation of a 
statute is not a regulation and therefore such an interpretation does not require compliance with 
the Alaska Administrative Procedures Act (APA).841 Pursuant to statute, the Alaska Department 
of Revenue (DOR) treated interdependently linked oil and gas fields as a single entity to 
determine tax obligations of oil producers.842 Producers, who operated smaller oil fields adjacent 
to one of the largest oil field in the United States, challenged the interpretation.843 They argued 
that the DOR’s decision to aggregate the fields was a regulation that required process under the 
APA.844 The supreme court disagreed with the producers that the DOR treatment was a 
regulation, because the decision to aggregate the fields was a commonsense interpretation of 
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statute, rather than an addition of a substantial requirement to the existing regulations.845 The 
court reasoned that the DOR’s decision to aggregate the fields was a commonsense interpretation 
because they interpreted the statute according to its terms, the definitions of key terms were 
foreseeable, and the decision did not depart from previous interpretations of the statute allowing 
for aggregation of interdependent fields.846 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held 
that a commonsense interpretation is not a regulation and therefore does not have to follow the 
APA.847 
 
 
ETHICS 
 
In re Stepovich 
In In re Stepovich,848 the supreme court held that a suspension greater than six months is an 
appropriate sanction when an attorney knowingly creates a conflict of interest by drafting a will 
for a client that names the attorney as the contingent beneficiary.849 The Alaska Bar initiated 
disciplinary proceedings against Stepovich for drafting a will for a terminally ill friend naming 
himself as the contingent beneficiary.850 Stepovich appealed the Disciplinary Board’s 
recommendation that the supreme court impose a six-month suspension.851 The supreme court 
reviewed the facts to determine the appropriate sanction for Stepovich’s misconduct using a 
three-step test: addressing (1) the duty the attorney violated; (2) the mental state of the attorney; 
and (3) the extent of actual or potential injury to the client, while considering aggravating and 
mitigating factors.852 The court found that Stepovich violated the Alaska Rules of Professional 
Conduct by writing a will potentially giving a substantial gift to himself.853 The court held that 
he knew of the conflict of interest his conduct created, as it was obvious, and that the aggravating 
factors—prior disciplinary offenses, the victim’s vulnerability, and substantial experience in the 
practice of law—outweighed the mitigating factors—absence of selfish or dishonest motive, 
remorse, disclosure and cooperation, and lack of experience.854 As a result, the court ordered a 
12-month suspension and for Stepovich to take and pass the Multistate Professional 
Responsibility Exam.855 Upholding the sanction, the supreme court held that a suspension from 
practice of law greater than six months is an appropriate sanction when an attorney knowingly 
creates a conflict of interest by drafting a will for a client that names the attorney as the 
contingent beneficiary.856 
 
FAMILY LAW 
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State v. Central Council of Tlingit 
In State v. Central Council of Tlingit,857 the supreme court held that tribal courts have inherent, 
non-territorial subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the child support obligations of parents of 
children who are tribal members or are eligible for membership.858 The Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act allows parents to register child support orders—for enforcement in Alaska—
that were issued by a tribunal of another state, as well as the tribal courts of federally recognized 
Indian tribes.859 The Central Council of Tlingit has an established tribal court system and a Tribal 
Child Support Unit that receives federal funding.860 The State opposed a child support order 
issued by this tribal court system.861 On appeal, the state argued that tribal courts do not have the 
proper jurisdiction to adjudicate child support issues or to issue child support orders to a non-
tribal-member parent.862 The supreme court reasoned, however, that the tribes’ powers of 
internal self-governance should include the power to adjudicate over child support issues just as 
it includes the power to adjudicate over child custody issues.863 The court further reasoned that 
these issues are integral to a tribe’s inherent power to self-govern over family law matters.864 The 
court also reasoned that parents should reasonably anticipate being required to support their 
children and perhaps being required to support their children by a court that is tied to the child 
rather than one of the parents.865 The court found that tribal court jurisdiction is thus attached to a 
tribal member or member-eligible child rather than the non-member parent.866 Affirming the 
lower court, the supreme court held that tribal courts have inherent, membership-based 
jurisdiction to adjudicate child support issues related to children who are tribal members or 
member-eligible.867 
 
Sweeney v. Organ 
In Sweeney v. Organ,868 the supreme court held that a court has not abused its discretion in 
making a custody decision when it primarily focuses on the best interests of the child, even when 
its decision does not explicitly outline all the relevant factors and also appears to contravene a 
parent’s abrasive conduct.869 Sweeney and Organ shared physical and legal custody of their 
child.870 Organ requested visitation time with their child that was outside the court’s order, and, 
when Sweeney denied his requests, Organ went to Sweeney’s residence with two Anchorage 
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police officers to give the child a present.871 Based on the court’s finding that Organ’s conduct 
was designed to be disruptive, Sweeney filed a motion to modify custody and was awarded all-
decision making authority for the child, but the court reinstated shared physical custody between 
the parties.872 The superior court based its custody rulings on the best interests of the child, 873 
but it did not explicitly outline in its decision the nine potentially relevant factors Alaska Statute 
25.24.150(c) required it to consider.874 Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme court 
reasoned that a custody decision made primarily based on the best interests of the child is not an 
abuse of discretion.875 The supreme court reasoned that, although the superior court did not 
explicitly list the factors under Alaska Statute 25.24.150(c), it considered the needs of the child, 
the parents’ capabilities in meeting those needs, the love and affection between the child and 
each parent, and emphasized the importance of the child’s environment when it concluded that a 
change from their regular custody routine would be disastrous to the child.876 The supreme court 
also noted that while it would have been in the court’s discretion to alter the custody agreement 
to reduce friction between the parties based on the findings of Organ’s bad behavior, it is the 
well-being of the child and not reward or punishment of a parent that ought to guide every aspect 
of custody determination.877 Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that 
a court has not abused its discretion in making a custody decision when it primarily focuses on 
the best interests of the child, even when its decision does not explicitly outline all the relevant 
factors and also appears to contravene a parent’s abrasive conduct.878 
 
Moira M. v. State 
In Moira M. v. State,879 the supreme court affirmed the termination of parental rights where the 
superior court did not abuse discretion in denying a motion for a placement review hearing and 
could have found that reasonable efforts were made by the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) 
to facilitate reunification.880 OCS took custody of the plaintiff’s child after a police officer found 
the infant alone in a parked car in a lot while plaintiff was wandering around the road under the 
influence of drugs.881 OCS began a reunification plan, but the plaintiff was uncommunicative, 
moved out of state without informing OCS, and did not adhere to drug treatment plans outlined 
in the plan to reunify her with her child in OCS custody.882 As a result, OCS determined 
permanent adoption was in the best interest of the child, and temporarily placed him with his 
paternal grandmother.883 The plaintiff requested a visitation review hearing, and, in response, 
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OCS established a family contact plan that included visitation but continued the process towards 
non-parental placement.884 At the termination hearing, the superior court terminated the parental 
rights, determining OCS had made reasonable efforts towards reunification and termination was 
in the best interests of the child.885 The plaintiff appealed on the basis that the superior court 
erred in denying her visitation review hearing and in their finding of reasonable efforts by 
OCS.886 The supreme court reasoned that the plaintiff’s request was properly denied, because the 
family contact plan developed by OCS included visitation.887 The supreme court also found that 
OCS made reasonable efforts towards serving the plaintiff in this case because the plaintiff’s 
move without informing OCS and her overall incommunicativeness supported the level of effort 
extended towards reunification rather than adoption.888 Affirming the superior court, the supreme 
held that a parent’s rights were properly terminated where her appeal requested relief already 
granted to her and OCS made reasonable efforts towards her case given the specific facts of the 
situation.889 
 
Mitchell v. Mitchell 
In Mitchell v. Mitchell,890 the supreme court held that actual income can be used to calculate 
child support for the following year and, in certain circumstances, an imputed income claim may 
be considered even if it was not properly raised in a cross-appeal.891 Michael and Johanna 
Mitchell married in 1996, had two children together, and then separated in 2009.892 Both parties 
represented themselves in the divorce and subsequent proceedings with the superior court 
accepting a divorce settlement in 2009.893 In 2012, Michael, then 47, retired from his job and 
withdrew $50,000 from his pension account to buy a house in Arizona.894 In 2014, Johanna filed 
a motion to modify child support claiming that the money Michael withdrew from his pension 
should have counted as income for 2013, and, in a separate claim, that his future payments 
should be calculated based on his income potential, rather than his actual income.895 The 
supreme court held that since Johanna had no way of knowing about the $50,000 at the time of 
withdrawal, the new information qualified as a material change of circumstances and upheld the 
superior court’s decision to set Michael’s 2014 child support calculation to reflect the increased 
income.896 The supreme court also held that the superior court erred in refusing to consider the 
claim that Michael was voluntarily and unreasonably unemployed.897 Johanna’s failure to cross-
appeal did not waive her right to contest the superior court ruling, because the court may relax 
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procedural requirements if it is clear what the self-represented party was attempting to 
accomplish.898 In addition, the court held that in the child support context, the court has an 
independent duty to determine if a child’s right to adequate support should be waived due to a 
procedural failure by a parent.899 Partially affirming and partially remanding to the superior 
court, the supreme court held that, for a child support calculation, the previous years income can 
be used for the following year and earning potential can be considered in addition to actual 
income.900 
 
Trevor M. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Trevor M. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,901 the supreme court held that 
parents that have “abandoned” their children by failing to regularly visit them for more than six 
months may have had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the abandonment within that same six-
month period.902 A father visited his daughter on July 31, 2014 and then essentially dropped off 
the face of her world thereafter.903 Despite the Office of Children’s Services’ repeated attempts 
to reach him, the father did not visit or get in touch with his child until January, 2015, seven and 
a half months later.904 Under Alaska Law, parents may legally abandon their children.905 Failing 
to maintain regular visitation for more than six months without justifiable cause is one of eight 
ways outlined in the statutes where such abandonment can occur.906 However, before terminating 
parental rights, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has had a 
reasonable opportunity to remedy the abandonment.907 On these facts, the superior court 
terminated the father’s parental rights to his child.908 He appealed, arguing that he did not 
abandon his daughter and that if he did he was not given enough time to remedy the problem.909 
The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s ruling on appeal, reasoning that the legislature 
could not have intended the end of the six-month period to mark only the beginning of a parent’s 
duty to remedy the conduct that endangered the child.910 Rather, in most circumstances, a 
responsible parent could be expected to attempt to remedy the conduct within the six-month 
period.911 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that parents that have 
“abandoned” their children by failing to regularly visit them for more than six months may have 
had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the abandonment within that same six-month period.912  
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Limeres v. Limeres 
In Limeres v. Limeres,913 the supreme court held that an evidentiary hearing for a motion to 
modify child support is only necessary upon a showing of substantially new, sufficient evidence 
of a material change in income-related circumstances.914 Rene Limeres appealed from the denial 
of his 2014 motion to modify his child support obligation, following his 2012 divorce and a prior 
failed attempt to have his support obligation modified in 2013.915 In denying his motion, the 
superior court declined to grant an evidentiary hearing regarding tax returns and affidavits 
showing Rene’s changed financial circumstances.916 Rene argued that his submitted evidence of 
changed circumstances regarding assets and employment entitled him to an evidentiary hearing 
on his motion.917 The supreme court held that to prevent successive and redundant hearings, the 
evidence submitted must sufficiently show a material, permanent reduction in income.918 The 
court reasoned this evidence must therefore be new—not simply additional evidence of 
previously asserted hardship, as judged by the timespan between motions and the similarity in 
amount and nature of income stated.919 Because Rene’s income evidence was not sufficiently 
different from, and was filed within months of, his previous motion,920 the supreme court 
affirmed the superior court’s denial of his motion without an evidentiary hearing.921 Affirming 
the lower court, the supreme court holding that an evidentiary hearing for a motion to modify 
child support is only necessary if the movant shows substantially new evidence of a material, 
permanent change in income-related circumstances.922 
 
Sharpe v. Sharpe 
In Sharpe v. Sharpe,923 the supreme court held it is appropriate to deny a request to reduce child 
support when a non-custodial parent’s voluntary unemployment would have an unreasonable 
impact on the financial resources of their child.924 Jolene Lyon, a non-custodial parent, was 
ordered to pay $1,507 to her ex-husband in monthly child support in 2012, largely based on her 
$120,000 salary in Anchorage.925 In 2013, Jolene voluntarily left her job to live a subsistence 
lifestyle in Stebbins, and subsequently filed a motion to reduce her monthly child support 
payments.926 In support of her motion, Jolene testified that the move had helped her alcohol 
abuse, and that she desired to introduce her child to traditional life.927 Jolene’s ex-husband 
countered that child support would benefit the child by providing help with housing, food, and 
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clothing.928 After hearing the arguments, the superior court acknowledged that the move to 
Stebbins had provided spiritual and personal benefits to Jolene, but denied the motion because 
Jolene’s voluntary unemployment did not eliminate her earning potential.929 On appeal, the 
supreme court reasoned that the duty to support a child supersedes legitimate voluntary 
unemployment decisions.930 Further, the court reasoned career changes could further personal or 
professional advancement, but the custodial parent should not bear the financial burden of the 
other parent’s career changes.931 Additionally, the court pointed to the statutory requirement that 
the court consider the financial impact on the child when reducing child support payments.932 
Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held it is appropriate to deny a request 
to reduce child support on the grounds that a non-custodial parent’s voluntary unemployment 
would have an unreasonable impact on the financial resources of their child.933 
 
Denny M. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Denny M. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,934 the supreme court held that 
services provided by a therapeutic mental health court can be considered in determining whether 
the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) made “active efforts” to reunify a family, even when 
the therapeutic court and OCS have little to no coordination.935 OCS developed a plan to reunify 
Denny M. and her children.936 During the plan, Denny M. was arrested for assault and ordered to 
receive services, including counseling and assisted living, through a therapeutic mental health 
court.937 Whether OCS and the therapeutic court communicated during this time is unclear.938 
When Denny M. repeatedly failed to respond to OCS, the superior court terminated her parental 
rights.939 On appeal, Denny M. argued that OCS passively relied on the therapeutic courts 
instead of making “active efforts” as required by law to reunify the family.940 The supreme court 
reasoned that services provided by agencies other than OCS, such as the therapeutic courts, are 
important to developing parental abilities and that OCS can rely on these services to avoid 
duplicating its own programs.941 The court also reasoned that there was no evidence that a lack 
of coordination between OCS and the therapeutic courts disadvantaged Denny M.942 Affirming 
the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that services provided by a therapeutic mental 
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health court can be considered in evaluating whether OCS made “active efforts” to reunify a 
family.943 
 
State, Office of Public Advocacy v. Estate of Jean R. 
In State, Office of Public Advocacy v. Estate of Jean R.,944 the supreme court held that 44.21.415 
bars private parties from recovering attorneys’ fees against the state in elder fraud protective 
order proceedings.945 The Office of Public Advocacy (“OPA”) petitioned for an elder fraud 
protective order to protect Jean R. from alleged financial exploitation by her daughter Sidney.946 
The superior court denied the petition, and Jean R. and Sidney moved to recover costs from 
OPA.947 The superior court, finding that OPA’s petition was filed without “just cause,” awarded 
costs under AS 13.26.131(d), which provides for fee shifting in guardianship proceedings that 
are brought maliciously, frivolously, or without just cause.948 On appeal, the supreme court held 
that neither AS 13.26.131 nor Civil Rule 82’s fee-shifting regime apply to elder fraud 
proceedings.949 Notwithstanding the elder fraud provision’s location in chapter 13.26 and AS 
13.26.131’s application to all provisions in chapter 13.26, the court reasoned that applying AS 
13.26.131 to elder fraud proceedings would allow a person accused of committing elder fraud to 
recover costs contrary to legislative intent.950 Instead, the court concluded that AS 44.21.415 
exclusively governs cost recovery in elder fraud proceedings.951 The court reasoned that AS 
44.21.415’s cost recovery scheme supersedes Civil Rule 82 because Civil Rule 82 does not apply 
when fee shifting is “otherwise provided by law.”952 The court also reasoned that the ability of 
OPA to recover costs under AS 44.21.415 and the exclusion of cost recovery against OPA are 
consistent with the legislative intent to limit OPA’s costs.953 Reversing the lower court’s award 
of attorneys’ fees, the supreme court held that AS 44.21.415 governs costs in elder fraud 
protective order proceedings and does not provide for an award of attorney’s fees against 
OPA.954 
 
Sherrill v. Sherrill 
In Sherrill v. Sherrill,955 the supreme court held that it is an abuse of discretion to base a child 
support determination on an income ceiling of $110,000 and on the omission of reported income, 
due to its temporary nature.956 Hallen and Sherrill separated in 2011, leading Hallen to move to 
																																																						
943Id. at 350–51. 
944 371 P.3d 614 (Alaska 2016). 
945 Id. at 615. 
946 Id. at 616. 
947 Id. at 616–17. 
948 Id. at 617–18. 
949 Id. at 618. 
950 Id. at 619–20. 
951 Id. at 623. 
952 Id. 
953 Id. at 622. 
954 Id. at 624. 
955 373 P.3d 486 (Alaska 2016). 
956 Id. at 493–94. 
	 68 
Alaska with the couple’s daughter.957 During divorce proceedings, the couple agreed to settle a 
property division by having Danny submit a one-time $35,000 payment to Hallen.958 
Additionally, the couple agreed Hallen would have primary physical custody of their daughter, 
while both parents would share legal custody.959 In determining child support payments, the 
superior court estimated Danny’s income to be $110,000, which the court also claimed reflected 
a statutory income ceiling.960 Despite Hallen’s protests that the court had not accounted for 
Danny’s retirement income or the statutory income ceiling of $120,000, the superior court 
calculated Danny’s child support payments based on a monthly income of $110,000.961 On 
appeal, after affirming the validity of the property division and the child custody order,962 the 
supreme court reviewed the issue of child support payment de novo for abuse of discretion.963 
The court determined that the noncustodial parent’s child support payments were based on 
adjusted annual income, which includes pensions and veterans’ benefits.964 Additionally, the 
court noted that the superior court had incorrectly used a $110,000 income cap to determine child 
support payments, as opposed to the general income ceiling of $120,000.965 The court also 
determined that Danny’s temporary contract work should not have been excluded from the 
superior court’s child support payment calculations.966 Reversing the superior court, the supreme 
court held it is an abuse of discretion to base a child support determination on an income ceiling 
of $110,000 and on the omission of reported income due to its temporary nature.967 
 
Herring v. Herring 
In Herring v. Herring,968 the supreme court held when an equitable reallocation mechanism 
provision exists in a divorce settlement, a significant change in either parties’ pension account 
triggers an equitable reallocation as a remedy.969 Patton and Herring were legally divorced in 
2013 after thirty-two years of marriage.970 The parties participated in mediation to decide the 
terms of their divorce.971 After negotiation, the parties agreed to divide Herring’s pension using a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) and to divide their IRA account.972 However, the 
IRA division was subject to an equitable reallocation mechanism, which was included to deal 
with the uncertainty of the pension’s split value following the QDRO.973 After the QDRO had 
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been processed, Patton’s portion of the pension decreased significantly in value, to the benefit of 
Herring, which caused Patton to ask the court to use the reallocation mechanism.974 However, the 
superior court held the equalization mechanism was not warranted and ordered the IRA account 
to be distributed in accordance with the original divorce settlement.975 The supreme court 
disagreed and concluded the equalization mechanism was an express provision which held the 
IRA funds in escrow until the pension amount could be verified.976 The court also reviewed the 
intent of the parties at the time of the settlement and concluded they agreed the equalization 
mechanism would compensate one or both parties after the results of the QDRO.977 Reversing 
the superior court, the supreme court held when an equitable reallocation mechanism provision 
exists in a divorce settlement, a significant change in either parties’ expected settlement amount 
triggers an equitable reallocation as a remedy.978 
 
Clementine v. State 
In Clementine v. State,979 the supreme court held that when the Office of Children’s Services 
(OCS) takes emergency custody of a “child in need of aid” (CINA) and then subsequently 
releases the child to another parent or guardian, the court may properly dismiss a CINA petition 
without first making findings on allegations toward the parent or guardian receiving the child and 
without allowing evidentiary hearings on the new custodians suitability to take care of the child 
to proceed.980 Clementine, the mother, was separated from the father, and taking care of their 
daughter.981 OCS took emergency custody of the child from Clementine after receiving reports of 
drug use, neglect, and other conduct by the mother, which placed the child at a high risk of 
harm.982 OCS then investigated the father and found that the child would be safe in his care.983 
The court subsequently ordered the release of the child to the father without confirming any of 
the probable cause findings about the mother.984 The court also granted the father’s motion to 
dismiss the mother’s petition for evidentiary hearings regarding the father’s suitability to care for 
the child.985 The CINA rules require the child to be returned to a parent or guardian in the 
absence of a finding of probable cause.986 Here, OCS conducted an investigation of the father, 
found that the child would be safe in his care, and subsequently returned the child and dismissed 
the case.987 On appeal, Clementine argued that the court erred by not conducting an evidentiary 
hearing on her allegations about the father’s conduct and for not making probable cause findings 
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against her.988 The supreme court reasoned that the CINA rules did not define that the child must 
be returned to a specific parent or guardian and that the lower court had good cause to dismiss 
the case after releasing the child.989 The supreme court also reasoned that Clementine had 
received all the relief to which she was entitled and that she was not entitled to further review of 
a case that had already been settled in her favor by dismissal.990 Affirming the lower court, the 
supreme court held that when a child in need of aid is taken into emergency custody and then 
subsequently released to another parent or guardian after first finding that the child would be 
safe, the other parent or guardian is not entitled to further review when the matter is dismissed in 
their favor.991 
 
Lee-Magana v. Carpenter 
In Lee-Magana v. Carpenter,992 the supreme court held that prevailing petitioners, although not 
prevailing respondents, should generally be awarded attorneys’ fees in protective order 
proceedings.993 Lee-Magana and Carpenter were in a romantic relationship for approximately 
two years and had a child together, but split amidst allegations of domestic violence.994 Lee-
Magana petitioned first for protective orders against Carpenter, which were granted.995 A few 
weeks after Lee-Magana’s filed those petitions, Carpenter filed for his own protective orders 
against Lee-Magana, which were denied by the same judge.996 Having prevailed in both 
petitions, Lee-Magana moved for attorneys’ fees for each proceeding, which the superior court 
denied without explanation.997 On reconsideration, the superior court stood by both of its 
decisions and explained that it was denying attorneys’ fees for Lee-Magana’s successful defense 
against Carpenter’s protective order petition out of concern for chilling worthy domestic violence 
victims’ pursuits of relief.998 As for Lee-Magana’s successful protective order petition against 
Carpenter, the superior court explained that, while Lee-Magana sought recovery under a statute 
that shifted fees in protective order proceedings for domestic violence victims, the hearing at 
which Lee-Magana ultimately won primarily addressed custody and child support issues.999 On 
appeal, the supreme court agreed with the superior court’s policy reasoning as to Lee-Magana’s 
defense against Carpenter’s petition and added that this was consistent with the relevant statute’s 
plain text.1000 However, the supreme court built on precedent developed in child support cases to 
conclude that the superior court erred in not granting attorneys’ fees in Lee-Magana’s successful 
petition because, based on the statute, withholding attorneys’ fees for prevailing protective order 
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petitioners is proper only in exceptional circumstances.1001 Accordingly, the supreme court 
affirmed the superior court’s decision to deny attorneys’ fees to Lee-Magana as a respondent, but 
reversed the decision to deny attorneys’ fees for her successful petition.1002 Affirming the 
superior court, the supreme court held that attorneys’ fees should generally be awarded to 
prevailing petitioners, although not prevailing respondents, in protective order proceedings.1003 
 
Collier v. Harris 
In Collier v. Harris,1004 the court of appeals held that the proper two-step process for a custody 
hearing requires determining if there is a substantial change in circumstances and then the best 
interests of the child.1005 Collier and Harris’ daughter was born in 2004, but the couple’s 
relationship ended in 2006.1006 In 2007, Collier and Harris agreed to a physical custody schedule 
and the superior court held that joint legal custody was in their daughter’s best interest.1007 In 
May 2013, Collier sought sole legal and physical custody and in the alternative requested that the 
superior court modify the custody schedule to reflect both parent’s changed schedules.1008 The 
superior court denied Collier’s motion to modify the joint custody and also denied her request to 
change the custody schedule.1009 In addition, the superior court granted Harris half of his 
attorney’s fees.1010 The court of appeals held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion, 
given it conducted an inquiry and determined there was sufficient communication between the 
parties and no significant change in circumstances.1011 In addition, the court of appeals held that 
the superior court properly considered all the facts cited by Collier in the aggregate.1012 The court 
of appeals also affirmed the superior court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s 
fees, because the superior court properly considered both the relative financial resources of the 
parties and whether the parties acted in good faith.1013 However, the court of appeals held that the 
superior court did abuse its discretion by not making a best interests inquiry and modifying the 
schedule to fit the daughter’s best interest, even though the superior court granted a leave to the 
parties to request status hearing for a workable schedule.1014 Affirming the superior court, the 
court of appeals held that the proper two-step process for a custody hearing requires determining 
if there is a substantial change in circumstances and then the best interests of the child.1015 
 
Abby D. v. Sue Y. 
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In Abby D. v. Sue Y.,1016 the supreme court held that, in order for a grant of custody over a child 
to be modified, the party seeking modification must show, in the aggregate, that his or her 
situation has changed since the time of the custody grant in such a way that modification of the 
grant would be in the child’s best interests.1017 Abby D. was a woman who suffered from mental 
health and substance abuse problems to such an extent that her mother, Sue Y., petitioned the 
superior court to be appointed the guardian of Abby D.’s daughter.1018 After a series of 
proceedings, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that leaving the daughter in Abby 
D.’s custody would be detrimental to the child’s best interests, and granted custody to Sue Y. and 
her husband.1019 Nine months later, Abby D. sought to have the custody grant modified on the 
grounds that there had been a “substantial change in her life’s circumstances,” such that it would 
be in her daughter’s best interests to be returned to her custody.1020 The superior court denied her 
motion.1021 Reviewing the denial of the motion, the supreme court examined the new 
circumstances in which Abby D. found herself both in the aggregate and in comparison to the 
situation she was in at the time of the custody grant to determine whether or not the change was 
significant enough to “overcome [the court’s] deep reluctance to shuttle children back and 
forth.”1022 The court was not convinced that the changes Abby D. had made to her life would be 
enduring enough to warrant transferring custody of her daughter again and that, when considered 
against the circumstances in which Abby D. had been when the grant was first made, the changes 
were not that substantial.1023 The supreme court ultimately upheld the superior court, holding 
that, in order for a grant of custody over a child to be modified, the party seeking modification 
must show that his or her aggregate circumstances have changed in such a way that revising the 
grant would be in the child’s best interests.1024 
 
Joy B. v. State 
In Joy B. v. State,1025 the supreme court held that parental rights were properly terminated where 
the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts toward reunification and the 
mother permanently left the state after refusing to cooperate in remedying the conduct that 
caused her children to require aid.1026 Joy B. fled to Alaska with her four daughters following 
extensive torture and abuse by her husband.1027 The resulting PTSD and family relations did not 
improve for Joy in Alaska, and OCS eventually removed the children from Joy’s care.1028 Joy 
then left the state after refusing to coordinate with OCS to remedy the causes of her children’s 
need for aid.1029 The superior court subsequently granted OCS’ petition to terminate the parental 
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rights.1030 On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that both OCS and the lower court were correct 
in finding that Joy had failed to remedy the conduct causing need of aid,1031 OCS made 
reasonable efforts towards reunification,1032 and termination of parental rights was in the best 
interests of the children.1033 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that reasonable 
efforts toward reunification, refusal of the parent to cooperate, and the parent’s relocation to 
another state supported termination of parental rights.1034  
 
 
 
 
HEALTH LAW 
 
In re HEATHER R. 
In In re Heather R.,1035 the supreme court held that the screening investigation required to 
involuntarily commit a person to emergency psychiatric evaluation must include an interview 
with the person if reasonably possible.1036 The neighbors of Heather R. filed a petition with the 
superior court, requesting that Heather be involuntarily committed because she was a threat to 
herself and to others.1037 A superior court master held an ex parte evidentiary hearing, consisting 
solely of testimony from the manager of Heather’s condominium complex and four of her 
neighbors, after which he found probable cause that Heather had a mental illness that presented a 
likelihood of harm to other people.1038 Heather was taken to a psychiatric facility but was 
discharged because she did not meet the criteria for hospitalization or commitment.1039  Heather 
subsequently appealed the evaluation order, arguing that the master did not conduct the screening 
investigation properly.1040 Even though Heather’s appeal came after she was discharged and was 
therefore moot, the supreme court applied the public interest exception to decide the case on the 
merits.1041 The public interest exception overrides the mootness doctrine when (1) the disputed 
issues can be repeated in other cases, (2) applying the mootness doctrine will allow review of 
issues to be repeatedly circumvented, and (3) the issues presented are of significant importance 
to the public interest.1042 Once the supreme court reached the merits of Heather’s claim, it held 
that the statutory language requires that a screening investigation include an interview with the 
respondent “if possible.”1043 Since the master made no attempt to interview Heather and did not 
include any finding that interviewing her would not be possible, the ex parte hearing violated the 
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statutory requirements for involuntary commitment.1044 The supreme court reversed and vacated 
the superior court’s order, holding that a screening investigation should not omit an interview 
with the respondent unless an interview is not reasonably possible.1045  
 
The Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mark V. 
In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mark V.,1046 the supreme court held that 
the petitioner bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that a respondent is 
gravely disabled and that commitment is the least restrictive alternative.1047 Anchorage police 
took Mark V. into custody and transported him to a psychiatric emergency department after he 
“presented himself nude in public” and claimed to be the King of England.1048 He was 
transferred to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (“API”) after it was determined that he was gravely 
disabled as a result of paranoid schizophrenia.1049 The state filed a petition seeking to extend 
Mark V.’s commitment in API by thirty days.1050 To be involuntarily committed for thirty days, 
courts must find that an individual is gravely disabled.1051 At the thirty-day commitment hearing, 
Dr. Gee, a registered nurse, gave her opinion that if Mark V. returned home, he would not be 
able to properly maintain himself.1052 At the close of testimony, Mark V.’s attorney argued that 
Mark should be returned home on an outpatient treatment basis as a less restrictive alternative to 
hospitalization at API.1053 The magistrate judge held that there was clear and convincing 
evidence that Mark V. was gravely disabled and that there was no less restrictive alternative to 
hospitalization.1054 The superior court approved the thirty-day commitment order. 1055 On appeal 
the Supreme Court held that the petitioner bears the burden of proving that a gravely disabled 
person could not function even with the support of family and friends.1056 However, given Dr. 
Gee’s testimony about Mark’s condition, the magistrate judge’s finding was supported by clear 
and convincing evidence.1057 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that the 
petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is gravely disabled 
and that commitment is the least restrictive alternative.1058  
 
INSURANCE LAW 
 
Attorneys Liability Protection Society, Inc., v. Ingaldson Fitzgerald, P.C. 
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In Attorneys Liability Protection Society, Inc. v. Ingaldson Fitzgerald, P.C.,1059 the supreme 
court held Alaska law prohibits insurance policies that reimburse insurers for attorneys fees and 
costs of defense claims they are obligated to defend, even when the insured accepts the insurer’s 
explicit reservation of rights, and the claim is later determined to be outside the policy.1060 
Attorneys Liability Protection Society, Inc. (ALPS) insured the law firm Ingaldson Fitzgerlad 
under a policy that excluded fee disputes from coverage,1061 but reserved the right to be 
reimbursed for fees incurred defending claims outside of the policy1062. In a bankruptcy dispute, 
ALPS initially accepted Ingaldson’s tender of defense.1063 Ingaldson retained, and ALPS paid, 
independent counsel during the representation.1064 Eventually determining these claims were 
outside the policy, ALPS sued Ingaldson to recover reimbursements.1065 The district court denied 
ALPS’ recovery because the reimbursement provision did not comply with Alaska law.1066 After 
ALPS filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the supreme court undertook to answer the questions 
certified to it.1067 The court began its analysis by finding state case law confirmed that insurers 
are obligated to pay all necessary expenses of independent counsel even while reserving rights to 
assert subsequent coverage defenses.1068 The court then determined that the omission of statutory 
language regarding reimbursement indicated that reimbursement was precluded under Alaska 
law.1069 The court also noted that Alaskan statutes only absolve insurers for the financial 
responsibility of allegations resulting in denied claims, and that the insured are entitled to 
independent counsel when reservation of rights letters are submitted.1070 Answering the Ninth 
Circuit’s certification questions, the supreme court held Alaska law prohibits insurance policies 
that reimburse insurers for fees and costs of defense claims they are obligated to defend, even 
when the insured accepts the insurer’s explicit reservation of rights, and the claim is later 
determined to be outside the policy.1071 
 
PROPERTY LAW 
 
Beeson v. City of Palmer 
In Beeson v. City of Palmer,1072 the supreme court held that, in order for an inverse 
condemnation claim to be successful, governmental action must be a proximate cause of the 
alleged property damage.1073 Beeson lived on a plot of land in Palmer bounded by a road owned 
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by the city.1074 Beeson’s property would frequently flood in the spring.1075 He alleged that the 
flooding was due to the road’s obstruction of the land’s natural drainage, prompting him to bring 
an inverse condemnation claim against the city for the damage caused by the road.1076 At trial, 
the superior court found that the road “was not a substantial cause” of the flooding, leading to a 
judgment in favor of the city.1077 The supreme court held that a public improvement must be 
found to be a proximate cause—that is, “more likely than not a substantial factor in bringing 
about the injury”—in order for a reverse condemnation action to be successful.1078 Because 
proximate cause is a finding of fact, and not law, the supreme court deferred to the superior 
court’s finding that the road was not a proximate cause of the damage to Beeson’s property,1079 
and upheld the judgment in favor of the city.1080 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court 
held that governmental action must be a proximate cause of property damage in order for an 
inverse condemnation action to be successful.1081 
 
Pursche v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough 
In Pursche v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough,1082 the supreme court held that land with a federal 
patent in its chain of title is properly under the subject matter jurisdiction of the superior court 
and is subject to local taxes.1083 Ray Pursche owned real property that was originally conveyed 
by a federal homestead patent.1084 When Pursche failed to pay property taxes, the Matanuska-
Susitna Borough listed the property on its annual petition for foreclosure filed in superior 
court.1085 Pursche objected to the foreclosure, and the superior court granted summary judgment 
for the Borough.1086 On appeal, Pursche argued that the superior court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the property because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims 
involving federal land patents.1087 The supreme court reasoned that a federal patent in the chain 
of title does not by itself give rise to federal jurisdiction and that once a federal land patent 
issues, the disputes surrounding the property are matters of local property law that are properly 
resolved in local courts.1088 As the state’s court of general jurisdiction, then, the superior court 
properly exercised authority over this parcel.1089 The supreme court also reasoned that property 
once owned by the federal government becomes subject to local taxes when it is conveyed to a 
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private party.1090 Affirming the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the Borough, the 
supreme court held that the superior court properly exercised jurisdiction over property with a 
federal patent in its chain of title.1091 
 
Fink v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In Fink v. Municipality of Anchorage,1092 the supreme court held that lot owners are required to 
show they had a substantial interest in a disputed parcel of land to succeed in a quite title 
claim.1093 Matthew Fink is the owner of two lots in a subdivision, which was initially subdivided 
in May of 1952.1094 As a result of a 1964 earthquake, the subdivision’s bluff face flattened out 
and slid northward, causing the existing land between the pre-earthquake bluff face and the pre-
earthquake mean high-tide line to become developable and creating new land between the pre-
earthquake mean high-tide line and the post-earthquake mean high-tide line.1095 While it 
appeared the original plats of the subdivision had the lots' northern boundary at the top of the 
pre-earthquake bluff face, Fink alleged that his property actually extended north to the pre-
earthquake mean high-tide line.1096 However, the defendant argued Fink failed to show a 
substantial interest in the disputed parcel of land and thus could not succeed in his quite title 
claim; the superior court agreed.1097 Fink appealed to the supreme court arguing he had a 
substantial interest in the disputed parcel and that his interest was superior to the defendant’s 
interest.1098 The supreme court found that in order to determine whether the lot owner has a 
substantial interest in the disputed property, the deed must be interpreted.1099 Deed interpretation 
is a three-step analysis: (1) look to the four corners of the deed to see if it unambiguously 
presents the parties' intent; (2) if the deed is ambiguous, look at the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the conveyance to determine the parties’ intent; (3) if intent cannot be determined by 
either the deed or extrinsic evidence, a court should resort to rules of construction.1100 The court 
found that the deed was ambiguous as to the boundaries but concluded extrinsic evidence 
showed the intent of the parties did not included the disputed area.1101 Agreeing with the superior 
court, the supreme court held lot owners are required to show they had a substantial interest in a 
disputed parcel of land to succeed in a quite title claim.1102  
 
Alaska Trustee, LLC v. Ambridge 
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In Alaska Trustee, LLC v. Ambridge,1103 the supreme court held that businesses pursuing 
nonjudicial foreclosures are “debt collectors” under federal law and therefore subject to the 
requirements laid out by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.”1104 The Ambridges bought their 
first home in 2006 and took out a home loan secured by a deed of trust against the property.1105 
They fell behind in their payments and received a notice of default from Alaska Trustee in 
2009.1106 Federal law requires, among other things, that a consumer be informed of the amount 
of the debt in initial communications.1107 However, Alaska Trustee’s default notice to the 
Ambriges only stated the principal amount due, not the full amount, as it failed to specify what 
interest, late charges, or other costs were owed.1108 The Ambridges sued Alaska Trustee alleging 
violations of the FDCPA.1109 The superior court held that Alaska Trustee was a “debt collector” 
subject to the FDCPA and, accordingly, awarded the Ambridges $4,000 in damages.1110 Alaska 
Trustee appealed and argued that it was not a “debt collector” under the act because it did not 
seek the payment of money, only the recovery of collateral.1111 The supreme court affirmed the 
lower court’s ruling on appeal, reasoning that the FDCPA’s broad definition of “debt,” relevant 
legislative history, and analogous cases in other circuits support its interpretation of the Act.1112 
The supreme court emphasized that the FDCPA was passed for remedial purposes and, thus, 
should be construed liberally.1113 Moreover, it noted that accepting Alaska Trustee’s more 
narrow interpretation of  “debt” and “debt collector” would create an enormous loophole in the 
Act, immunizing any debt from coverage if it happened to be secured by a real property interest 
and foreclosure proceedings were used to collect the debt.1114 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that businesses pursuing nonjudicial foreclosures are “debt 
collectors” under federal law and therefore subject to the requirements laid out by the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act.”1115  
 
City of Kenai v. Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC 
In City of Kenai v. Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC,1116 the supreme court held that 
when the mineral and surface rights of a property have been severed, the rights to store injected 
natural gas in an emptied-out reservoir are included in the mineral rights.1117 Alaska law requires 
that the State reserves all mineral rights in conveyances of State land.1118 Cook Inlet Natural Gas 
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Storage Alaska, LLC (CINGSA) leased the rights to store gas in an empty reservoir from the 
holders of the property’s mineral rights, the State and Cook Inlet Region, Inc. (CIRI).1119 
However, the City of Kenai claimed that gas storage rights were not included in the severed 
mineral rights, and so they belonged to the City as the owner of the surface.1120 CINGSA brought 
a complaint against the City and interplead the State and CIRI as defendants, seeking declaratory 
judgment that the City did not own the gas storage rights.1121 CIRI and the City cross-moved for 
summary judgment, and the superior court ruled that natural gas storage rights were included in 
the mineral rights reserved to the State at the time of conveyance.1122 The supreme court agreed, 
holding that the language of Alaska law includes gas storage rights as mineral rights.1123 The 
court found that “mineral” is not defined by statute, but that a broad definition matches the broad 
scope of the requirement that rights be reserved.1124 The court reasoned that thinking of the 
emptied reservoir, called “pore space,” as a “void” and therefore not a mineral is too 
simplistic.1125 The court found that pore space is a matrix of microscopic holds that are given 
form by minerals, and is therefore expressly within the scope of the statute.1126 The court also 
held that interpreting gas storage rights as within mineral rights furthers the statute’s purpose, 
which was to maximize the State’s revenue from the subsurface uses of the land it conveyed.1127 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court ruled that natural gas storage rights are 
part of the mineral rights of a property, not the surface rights.1128 
 
State v. Alaska Laser Wash, Inc. 
In State v. Alaska Laser Wash, Inc.,1129 the supreme court held business damages cannot be 
recovered by a business owner in a taking unless relocation of the business is not feasible.1130 As 
part of a state highway improvement project, the state manifested their intent to acquire one of 
three car washes owned by Alaska Laser Wash, which company was owned by Trefry.1131 
Eventually, the state purchased the location from Trefry.1132 Despite being offered a check for 
relocation, Trefry did not build a new car wash location.1133 Even though he did not open a new 
location, and sold his business, Trefry sued the state for lost business in an inverse condemnation 
claim.1134 At trial, Trefry was awarded nearly two million dollars in damages for lost business, 
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which the jury found were not included in the purchase price.1135 Moreover, the jury found 
Trefry did not have a duty to relocate and mitigate these damages according to a reasonableness 
standard.1136 On appeal, the supreme court noted that Trefry’s damages were only recoverable if 
they directly resulted from the state’s taking.1137 The court first reasoned that most states used 
feasibility standards in determining awards such as business damages.1138 The court went on to 
explain this standard only allowed business damages when owners are prevented from moving 
their businesses.1139 The court then rejected Trefry’s contention that precedent from other states 
was inapplicable to Alaska, as well as the reasonableness test Trefry proposed.1140 Reversing the 
superior court, the supreme court held business damages cannot be recovered by a business 
owner in a taking unless relocation of the business is not feasible.1141 
 
TORT LAW 
 
Marshall v. Peter 
In Marshall v. Peter,1142 the supreme court held that reasonable jurors could disagree over 
whether the defendant was negligent in an automobile accident case.1143 Defendant Peter came to 
a complete stop behind the car of plaintiff Marshall at a red light, leaving about one-half car 
length between them.1144 When the light turned green Marshall began to move forward, but then 
stopped before entering the intersection when the light turned red.1145 Peter claimed he was 
focusing on the space between his car and hers,1146 and that he had not even placed his foot on 
the accelerator when he slid into Marshall’s vehicle.1147 At trial, the lower court denied 
Marshall’s motion for a directed verdict, stating that there was evidence to suggest liability was 
an issue.1148 The lower court reasoned that since Peter had just stopped, was aware of the icy 
conditions, and made sure to leave distance between their cars, reasonable persons could 
disagree about whether Peter was negligent.1149 On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that since 
a following driver exercising due care is one who, among other things, anticipates changing road 
conditions and sudden stops, there is evidence to suggest Peter was not driving negligently and 
that a directed verdict would be inappropriate.1150 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the 
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supreme court held that in an automobile case, reasonable jurors could disagree over whether the 
defendant was negligent.1151 
 
Jones v. Westbrook 
In Jones v. Westbrook,1152 the supreme court held that, for malpractice claims, an attorney’s 
negligent contracting results in cognizable injury only when such negligence proximately causes 
actual harm, not merely when the flawed contract becomes effective.1153 In 2003, Jones retained 
Westbrook to represent him in the sale of his corporation, which Jones had decided to finance 
himself.1154 According to Jones, he told Westbrook to ensure the company’s business assets 
would secure the buyer’s debt.1155 The buyer made regular payments, but missed one in October 
2005.1156 In October 2011, due to tax issues, the IRS placed two liens on the company’s assets, 
eventually selling them and closing the company.1157 Accordingly, Jones filed a complaint 
against Westbrook in December 2013, alleging malpractice based on Westbrook’s alleged failure 
to properly document the sale of the company.1158 Westbrook raised the statute of limitations as a 
defense and moved for summary judgment.1159 The superior court granted his request, finding 
that the statute of limitations on Jones’ malpractice claim began running in October 2005, when 
Jones was first notified of the buyer’s late payment.1160 At that point, the court reasoned, a 
prudent businessman would have been put on inquiry notice that the buyer’s payments were not 
secured by the company’s physical assets.1161 On appeal, the supreme court held that the statute 
of limitations had not started running until October 2011, because Jones had not suffered an 
appreciable injury yet.1162 Specifically, the court reasoned that Jones had not lost his ability to 
recover the company’s physical assets in the case of the buyer’s default until the IRS recorded 
liens on them. Consequently, the supreme court held it was clear error to find that the statute of 
limitations barred Jones’ claim.1163 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that an 
attorney’s negligent contracting results in cognizable injury for a malpractice claim only when 
such negligence proximately causes actual harm, not when the contract becomes effective.1164 
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